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This Article reports some of the results of an empirical study of
the bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held companies.
We present data relevant to what many consider to be the central
issue of reorganization theory-how the value of the reorganizing
enterprise should be divided among the various claims and
interests.1 We demonstrate that there is indeed systematic devia-
tion from the absolute priority rule in favor of junior interests; but,
with respect to large, publicly held corporations, the debate about
how to prevent these deviations is, for the most part, a tempest in
a teapot-the difference between absolute priority and the actual
outcomes of these cases is relatively small.
Current law provides a complex legal environment in which
representatives of thousands of creditors and shareholders bargain
over the disposition of billions of dollars in assets. Adjudication of
cases within that environment is thought to be virtually impossible.
Prior to this study, the operation of this system was largely inacces-
sible to scholars. This inaccessibility results largely from the sheer
size of the cases, which makes it difficult to gain an overview, and
from the private nature of the bargaining process as contrasted with
adjudication.
Over the four years of our study, we collected and reviewed over
35,000 pages of written materials, prepared financial analyses of the
distributions in each of forty-three cases according to a uniform set
of valuation protocols, and conducted more than 120 interviews
with lawyers who played key roles in negotiations leading to
confirmation of reorganization plans. We hope our efforts will
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1 See Baird, The Uneasy Casefor CoiPorate Reorganization, 15J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 127-
35 (1986); Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARv. L. REV. 775,
777-81 (1988); Jackson & Scott, Cn the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy
Sharing and the Credito2" Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155, 158-60 (1989); Roe, Bankruptcy
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establish a more accurate factual framework upon which bankruptcy
scholars will base their theories in the future.
In Part I of this Article, we describe the legal context in which
the bargaining and settlement of major reorganization cases occur.
Part II describes the history and the policies that have shaped the
current legal rules. Readers already familiar with these subjects may
wish to turn directly to Part III, in which we describe our methodol-
ogy. In Part IV we present our findings as to the frequency of
"settlement" in these cases. In Parts V and VI, we present our
findings as to the terms of settlement, comparing the legal entitle-
ments of various participants in hypothetical adjudications and their
recoveries under the actual settlement agreements. In these parts,
we also discuss the possible reasons for "gaps" between the
hypothetically correct solutions in adjudication (as provided by the
absolute priority rule) and the settled outcomes. Part VII discusses
the implications of these empirical findings for bankruptcy policy.
I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT IN WHICH BARGAINING OCCURS
In the absence of bankruptcy proceedings, a creditor who
remains unpaid after the debt becomes due can, by following the
proper procedures, force the sale of enough of the debtor's business
assets to pay the outstanding claim. Even a single creditor holding
a sufficiently large claim may force the closing of a debtor's
business. To avoid this result, debtors who are unable to make
timely payment usually bargain with threatening creditors for
extensions of time. A debtor who does not reach a satisfactory
agreement has the alternative of filing a bankruptcy case. Upon the
filing of a bankruptcy case, creditors lose their right to force
liquidation under state law; subsequently, liquidation can occur only
with the approval of the bankruptcy court.
As a practical matter, for large business debtors seeking to
continue operations, a bankruptcy case must be brought under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. A primary public policy
underlying chapter 11 is to identify the cases in which the "going
concern value" of the business exceeds its "liquidation value" and
then to shield the business against efforts to force liquidation in
order that the entire going concern value can be realized for the
collective benefit of creditors and shareholders.
2
2 The "going concern" value of a business is defined as the value the business will
have if it continues to operate. In effect it is a discounting of anticipated future income
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Bankruptcy law attempts to implement this policy through a
variety of means. The most important is the formulation and
"confirmation," or adoption, of a plan of reorganization, which
typically alters the relationship between the debtor and its creditors
and shareholders. For example, a plan may extend the time for
payment of the debtor's obligations, reduce the amounts of those
obligations, compel creditors to accept stock in full or partial
payment of their rights, or even cancel stock or obligations without
compensation. 3 Ordinarily, the purpose of the chapter 11 plan is
to alter the rights of creditors and shareholders such that the debtor
will emerge from chapter :11 with a debt load that it can meet from
anticipated future income.
A key feature of chapter 11 is that the debtor's management
remains in control of the corporation. 4 Not only is management
in charge of the company's day to day business affairs, but it also
plays a key role in the drafting of a reorganization plan. This role
is essentially guaranteed by the debtor's exclusive right to propose
a formal plan of reorganization during the first 120 days of the
proceeding and during such extensions of that period as the court
may allow. 5 In a large majority of the cases in our study, exten-
sions were routinely granted for the duration of the case. 6 When
exclusivity is maintained, the debtor corporation's management
drafts and proposes a plan of reorganization after consulting and
to its present value. "Liquidation value" is the value that will be realized if the business
is sold, either as a unit or in parts. Although traditionally it has been assumed that
there usually is a substantial difference between these two values, this assumption has
recently been called into question with regard to large corporations of the kind we are
studying. See Baird, supra note 1, at 136.
3 In a large case, the plan of reorganization will be about 40 to 100 printed pages,
plus attachments that may double its size. The plan may deal with a wide variety of
issues in addition to those mentioned in the text. For example, it may provide the
terms for sale of all or part of the business or restrictions regarding governance of the
corporation. In most cases, the plan deals with the financial problems of several entities
in the debtor's corporate group; in many of those cases the provisions governing
reorganization of the various members are not the same.
4 This is an important change from the law that governed these kinds of cases
before 1979. Under the old chapter X, a trustee was appointed to oversee management
and draft the reorganization plan-
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1988). Theoretically, the court could shorten the period
to less than 120 days "for cause," but that seldom occurs. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)
(1988).
6 In the 43 cases in our sample, described later in this Article, exclusivity was
"lifted," or not extended, in nine cases. In all other cases exclusivity was maintained for
the duration of proceeding, even though most of the cases (27 of 43) remained pending
for more than two years.
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negotiating with the key representatives of the creditors and
sometimes the shareholders. Those representatives may include
"official" committees appointed by the United States Trustee,7
unofficial committees organized by members of the affected group,
or other representatives, such as indenture trustees or the attorneys
for the plaintiffs in a class action. Whether or not the representa-
tives agree to a proposed plan, management can force a vote of the
affected creditors and shareholders.
If the proponent pushes a proposed plan to a vote, each affected
creditor and shareholder of the debtor receives a copy of the plan,
information approved by the court as adequate for the evaluation
of the plan in the form of a "disclosure statement," and a ballot to
vote for or against the plan. The procedure for voting is complex.
A plan must group the claims of creditors and the interests of
shareholders into "classes," and it must provide the same treatment
for all members of a class.8 If confirmation of the plan would alter
the members' legal rights,9 they have the right to vote on whether
to accept or reject it. If the holders of a majority in number and
two thirds in amount of the claims or interests of a class vote in
favor of the plan, the class is deemed to have accepted the plan.'
0
Dissenting creditors or shareholders who are grouped by the plan
into classes that have accepted it are considered bound by the vote
of approval, meaning that their continued dissent does not in itself
prevent confirmation of the plan. They remain entitled to object to
confirmation if the plan fails to satisfy any of several statutory
requirements. Probably the most important is that the value each
dissenting claimant will receive under the plan must be at least as
7 Although appointment of an unsecured creditors' committee is supposed to be
automatic in chapter 11 cases, an equity committee is appointed only if the United
States Trustee or the court deems it appropriate. See infra notes 171-72 and
accompanying text. If the court authorizes the appointment of a committee, the United
States Trustee selects its members.
8 The Bankruptcy Code provides that a class may only contain substantially similar
claims or interests. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1988). For example, one class may contain
claims secured by a first mortgage on plant and equipment, another may contain all
unsecured claims, and a third may contain the interests of preferred shareholders. We
found cases in our study in which claims with potentially different rights were grouped
in the same class when the plan provided that those claims were to be treated similarly.
For example, subordinated creditors might be grouped with general unsecured creditors
if the subordination provision was to be waived under the proposed plan.
9 A plan that does not alter the rights held by members of a class is said to leave
them "unimpaired." See id. § 1124.
10 See id. § 1126(c).
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great as the value that claimant would receive in liquidation.
n If
these requirements are met, however, the dissenters' legal rights can
be modified despite their lack of consent.
Even if a class votes against the plan, a plan proponent may seek
to have it confirmed under provisions of the Code appropriately
referred to as the "cram down" provisions. Under these provisions,
the court is required to confirm a plan even though some impaired
classes have not accepted, provided the plan treats those classes
"fair[ly] and equitabl[y]" and does not "discriminate unfairly"
against them.' 2 The condition that a plan be fair and equitable
requires that senior classes receive absolute priority over junior
classes; this condition is thus known as the "absolute priority rule."
For example, absolute priority with respect to an objecting class of
unsecured creditors means that the plan must either propose full
payment to the members of that class or provide for cancellation
without compensation of the interests of shareholders and of the
claims of any subordinate creditor classes. A corollary of the rule
is that the plan may not offer more than full payment of their claims
to members of classes that. are senior.
13
While the absolute priority rule governs any adjudication of the
rights of unsecured creditors and shareholders to share in the
distribution under the plan, a variety of reasons may cause the
representatives of creditors and shareholders to wish to settle their
rights on a different basis. A principal reason is to avoid litigation
over whether the standards for cram down are satisfied. A cram
down determination requires a potentially difficult valuation of
properties, such as debt instruments and shares, distributed to
particular classes. Such valuation can be expensive and time
consuming. In order to gain the support of all classes, however, it
is necessary to provide at least some distribution to each class,
regardless of the dictates of the absolute priority rule. 14  Our
1 This is the so-called "best interests of creditor" test. See id. § 1129(a)(7).
12 Id. § 1129(b). There are a number of other conditions to confirmation. For
example, at least one impaired class of creditors must accept the plan, see id.
§ 1129(a)(10), and the court must determine that the plan has been proposed in good
faith. See id. § 1129(a)(3).
1 Although this provision is not express in the statute, the legislative history
supports it, and there is a consensus among courts and commentators that it is a
prerequisite to confirmation by cram down. See Klee, Cram Down II, 64 AM. BANKR. LJ.
229, 231 (1990).
14 A class that is to receive nothing under a plan is deemed to have rejected it and
the plan is not even submitted to the class for a vote. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(g) (1988).
Hence, in this circumstance, confirmation could only be obtained by cram down.
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Article primarily concerns the bargaining over these distributions to
junior interests.
IL THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF BARGAINING IN BANKRUPTCY
CASES
Under the law governing large corporate reorganizations prior
to 1978, the parties in interest could not avoid formal application
of the absolute priority rule or the necessity for a hearing by settling
on the terms of a reorganization plan. As one prominent prac-
titioner-commentator has put it, "Chapter X of the [former law] was
interpreted... as precluding settlement by the creditors and equity
holders involved in the case." 15 The author did not mean that the
parties in interest were prohibited by law from agreeing on a plan,
but only that the agreement could not eliminate the need for a
hearing to determine whether the settlement was strictly in accord
with the absolute priority rule. Settlement could assure that the
parties participating in the settlement would not actively contest the
plan at confirmation, but the proponent of the plan would still have
to prepare the case and present it to the court. This presentation
included evidence of the value of the various instruments-notes,
debentures, and other reorganization securities-to be distributed
under the plan. Individual creditors or investors who were not
parties to the settlement could and sometimes did contest those
values. Even though the values being proven were considered to be
nothing more than "a guess compounded by an estimate," 16 "[tlhe
imposition of the absolute priority rule required in every chapter X
case that the reorganized debtor be valued by the bankruptcy court
to insure compliance." 17 Although the bankruptcy courts could,
and in many cases probably did, confirm plans that deviated from
the absolute priority rule, 18 they could do so only after a possibly
expensive hearing and even then only by ignoring their mandate.
This formalistic procedure for application of the absolute
priority rule was adopted in 1939, following what was believed to
15 Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative,
39 Bus. LAW 441, 441 (1984).
16 Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
301, 313 n.62 (1982) (citing statement reported in H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 222, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6181).
17 Broude, supra note 15, at 442.
"' See Note, Absolute Priority Under Chapter X-A Rule of Law or a Familiar Quotation'
52 COLUM. L. REv. 900, 909-20 (1952).
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have been widespread abuse of the previous equity receivership
procedure, which operated largely outside the purview of the
statutory bankruptcy laws. Under the old equity receivership
procedure, it was possible for the parties in interest to a corporate
reorganization, voting by classes, to agree on a reorganization
plan-thereby reaching a settlement of their conflicting claims. A
highly influential report of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion 19 reported that in many reorganizations, powerful interests,
particularly management and large banks, connived to reap a
disproportionate share of the properties distributed in the reorgani-
zation. Victims were typically trade creditors and public debt
holders. These groups found it difficult to organize and to hire
representatives to negotiate on their behalf or to acquire the
information needed to evaluate reorganization proposals put to
them by "insiders." The result frequently was approval of a plan
providing far less to disadvantaged creditors than their due under
the absolute priority rule. As a solution to this problem, in 1939
Congress required court approval of all reorganization plans,
coupled with the mandatory appointment of a trustee in chapter X
cases involving publicly held corporations; this enabled the court to
receive information about proposed plans from an unbiased
source.
20
In the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, Congress sought to eliminate the
need for a judicial valuation of the properties to be distributed in
every case, because this procedure had come to be viewed as unduly
expensive and productive of delay.2 1 Congress accomplished this
end by permitting a final resolution of the issue through bargaining
among the representatives of the affected creditors and sharehold-
ers, followed by a vote. Although the drafters of the 1978 Code left
19 See SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM'N, 1 REPORT ON THE STUDY & INVESTIGATION OF
THE WORK, AcTrIvrrIEs, PERSONNEL & FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMMirrEEs 243-90 (1937). This report is widely known as the Douglas Report, named
for William 0. Douglas, the chair of the SEC at the time of the study.
20 For excellent discussions of the 1939 changes and their rationale, see Brudney,
The Bankruptcy Commission's Proposed "Modffications" of the Absolute Priority Rule, 48 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 305, 314-16 (1974); Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HARv. L.
REV. 780,787 (1942) [hereinafter Dodd, Fair]; Dodd, The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's Reform Program for Bankruptty Reorganizations, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 225-38
(1938) [hereinafter Dodd, Securities]; Rostow & Cutler, Competing Systems of Coiporate
Reorganization: Chapters X and XT of the Bankruptcy Ac4 48 YALE L.J. 1334, 1338-40
(1939).
21 See Brudney, supra note 20, at 310-11; Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations:
For the Benefit of Creditors or Stockholdersi 21 UCLA L. REv. 540, 545-46 (1973).
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the absolute priority rule in effect for cases that reached adjudica-
tion, they anticipated that settlements might deviate from this rule,
as they had before the 1939 reforms:
The bill does not impose a rigid financial rule for the plan.
The parties are left to their own to negotiate a fair settlement.
The question of whether creditors are entitled to the going-
concern or liquidation value of the business is impossible to
answer. It is unrealistic to assume that the bill could or even
should attempt to answer that question. Instead, negotiation
among the parties after full disclosure will govern how the value
of the reorganizing company will be distributed among creditors
and stockholders. The bill only sets the outer limits on the
outcome: it must be somewhere between the going-concern value
and the liquidation value.
Only when the parties are unable to agree on a proper
distribution of the value of the company does the bill establish a
financial standard. ... The important difference [from prior law]
is that the bill permits senior classes to take less than full payment,
in order to expedite or insure the success of the reorganization.
22
At least part of Congress's motivation in 1979 for encouraging
settlements that deviated from the absolute priority rule was the
assumption that the deviations would be in favor of the "public"
shareholders and debentureholders, who today typically have junior
status and lose out to banks and other financial institutions when
the absolute priority rule is strictly applied.23 By the 1970s, public
shareholder classes were understood to be largely "little guys,"
rather than the investment bankers who were thought to have
owned or controlled shareholder interests in the pre-1939 reor-
ganizations. 24 Consequently, deviations from the absolute priority
rule in favor of shareholders were not viewed so unfavorably.
Before this study, there had been considerable speculation in
the literature that under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, equity classes
were receiving more than they are entitled to under the absolute
priority rule. 25 The authors of these speculations generally assume
2 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 224 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
2 See 124 CONG. REc. 34,004 (statement of Sen. DeConcini, Ariz.); see also Davis,
The Status of Defrauded Securityholders in Corporate Bankruptcy, 1983 DUKE LJ. 1, 64-65
(arguing that in a bankruptcy of a publicly held corporation, creditors are more likely
than shareholders to be "institutional").24 See generally Dodd, Securities, supra note 20, at 233,251-53 (stating that investment
bankers, more than any other group, control shareholder interests).
2 See, e.g., Baird, supra note 1, at 137 (noting that junior owners will favor delay in
hopes of finding buyers who will pay higher prices for existing assets because they do
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that concessions to equity are the price senior classes must pay to
get all equity classes to accept a consensual plan and thus to avoid
an expensive and time consuming cram down hearing. It is also
commonly assumed that management, which often holds consider-
able bargaining leverage in negotiations because of its exclusive
power to propose a plan and its easier access to financial informa-
tion, holds out for a significant distribution to equity.
26
III. METHODOLOGY
As part of a broader study of the bankruptcy reorganization of
large, publicly held companies, we sought to determine the
frequency with which the parties were able to settle large bankrupt-
cy reorganization cases, the degree to which the settlements
deviated from the absolute priority rule, and the causes of the
deviations.
Our sample consisted of all businesses which (1) filed proceed-
ings under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code after October 1,
1979; (2) declared assets of more than $100 million as of the time
not have to pay the cost of additional searching, and that consequently, junior owners
must be "bought out"); Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 780 (stating that equityholders use
delaying power to extract more value than that to which they are entitled). There has
been one small empirical study prior to this one, the results ofwhich tended to confirm
the suspicion. See Franks & Touros, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Finns in
Reorganization, 44J. FIN. 747, 755 (1989) ("[The results of this study] suggest that...
there are large deviations from absolute priority.").26 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 799. Bebchuk states that "equityholders usually
have the exclusive right ... to file (and seek confirmation of) a reorganization plan."
Id. Actually, the right is given to the "debtor," see 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1988), and
exercised by the debtor's management. Bebchuk apparently assumes that the debtor
will exercise this right for the benefit of shareholders, so that it is not necessary to
distinguish the two. See also Franks & Touros, supra note 25, at 759 (speculating that
managers deliberately and systematically overstate values and attempt to deceivejudges
in order to benefit shareholders); Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans:
Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY LJ. 1009, 1060 (1987)
("[S]hareholders exercise indirect influence by controlling the selection of directors and
influencing management. By exercising these rights, the public owners may be able to
retain ownership through negotiation." (footnote omitted)). The legislative history
indicates that Congress did not trust management to protect the interests of
shareholders, but instead saw equity committees in that role. Congress believed that
the debtor in distress has a "natural tendency .... to pacify large creditors, with whom
the debtor would expect to do business, at the expense of small and scattered public
investors." S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978). Committees were
expected to be the "primary negotiating bodies for the formulation of the plan of
reorganization.... They will also provide supervision of the debtor in possession....
and will protect their constituents' interests." H. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
401 (1977).
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of filing; (3) were the issuer of at least one class of security that was
publicly traded; and (4) confirmed reorganization plans by March
31, 1988. There were forty-three such cases. For each of these
cases we: (1) studied and extracted data from the plans, disclosure
statements, confirmation orders, and the company's SEC filings; (2)
read newspaper, magazine, and trade journal accounts of the case;
(3) obtained information from published and unpublished sources
about the market values of each type of property distributed under
the plan; (4) did a financial analysis of the distributions; and (5)
interviewed two to four attorneys or others who participated in
negotiating the plan.
In our financial analysis, we gave special attention to a compari-
son of the distributions to unsecured creditors and shareholders.
Our intent was to measure both the existence and the extent of
deviations from the absolute priority rule in favor of shareholders.
To make this measurement, in each case we sought to determine
both the amount of creditor claims and the market value of the
distributions to creditors and shareholders as of the day after confir-
mation.
In gathering the data, we encountered methodological problems.
Disputed or unliquidated claims are frequently not determined until
long after confirmation of the plan and we were commonly forced
to rely on estimates of what would be the total claims in the case.
Distributions made at the time of confirmation in cash or publicly
traded securities presented few valuation problems. Many of the
distributions, however, were made long after confirmation, and
some distributions included securities, debt instruments, or other
promises of future payment for which we could obtain little or no
post-confirmation trading data.27  In other cases, the amounts
finally distributed depended upon the amounts to be realized after
confirmation from the liquidation of assets or the determination of
litigation. In such cases we sometimes had to rely on estimates.
We recorded the principles used to resolve specific problems in
a set of "valuation protocols." Using these protocols we were able
to compile estimates of the value of the distributions in all but two
of the forty-three sample cases. These protocols enabled us to
ensure that we acted consistently from case to case: because of this
consistency, we have confidence that these estimated values permit
2 In a few cases, we used the midpoint between bid and asked prices for securities
because there were no actual trades.
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us to draw reliable conclusions about the distribution to a class
relative to the distribution to similarly situated classes in other
cases.
28
It should be noted that if the cases in our study had been
adjudicated, the courts would have valued the distributions by
methods different from ours. We used post-confirmation trading
values in all cases in which they were available-information that
would not normally be available to the courts. Furthermore, legal
28 While these protocols are too lengthy to reproduce here, they are available upon
request and will also become, along with the rest of our data, part of the National
Science Foundation data storage system at the University of Michigan.
Some examples may help to illuminate the nature of the decisions reflected in our
protocols and their possible effects on our findings. When valuing a promise to pay
money at a future date certain, we first tried to obtain a trading value for the debt
instrument. If one was available, we discounted that value from the day the trade
occurred back to the day after confirmation. If we were unable to obtain a trading
value, we assumed that the payments would be made by the debtor as scheduled and
discounted those payments to their present value as of the day after confirmation.
The rates we employed in discountingvaried depending upon the date of confirma-
tion and the length of time for which the creditor's "investment" was locked in. If the
values were locked in for less than a year, we used the average of the "Prime Rate
Charged By Banks" as reported in table A23 in the Federal Reserve Bulletin on the first
day of the month in which confirmation occurred and the "money market" rate for
three month U.S. Treasury bills in the secondary market as reported in table A24 in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin for the month before confirmation. (That is, the Treasury bill
rate is applied in the month after it is generated.) For obligations payable more than
seven years after confirmation, we used Moody's Baa rate for corporate bonds as
reported in table A24 of the Federal Reserve Bulletin (the "Baa rate"). For obligations
of intermediate length, we applied blended averages of these two rates.
We did not vary the rates with the level of risk assumed, because we could develop
no objective standard for evaluating the level of risk. Instead, we chose to treat
obligations payable in more than seven years as though they had the same level of risk
as a bond carrying a Baa rating from Moody's Investment Service. For obligations of
lesser duration we assumed a lower level of risk. These levels of risk are probably lower
than the risk presented by any of the securities or other obligations issued by debtors
studied; for some it is probably much lower.
Our choice of discount rate had very little effect in most cases, because the
securities or obligation traded shortly after confirmation and the discount period was
short. Its most significant effect was in the few cases where the debtor issued long term
obligations that bore inadequate rates of interest and did not trade. The effect of our
choice was that in those cases our figures would tend to overstate the value of future
payments promised to creditors, but our figures would be very unlikely to understate
the true value. Since shareholders almost never received debt obligations, these difficul-
ties had almost no effect on our valuation of their distributions.
While we sought to value distributions as of the day after confirmation and ignore
fluctuations in value which occurred afterward, we made an exception for some
distributions that depended upon the amounts for which particular assets could be
liquidated after confirmation. In several cases, the values in these "liquidating trusts"
were wholly speculative at the time of confirmation, but easily calculated once the
liquidations were complete. In those cases we allowed ourselves the luxury of hindsight.
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doctrine maintains that the market values of reorganization
securities are frequently depressed below the "true" value of the
securities and that the true value can only be determined by
estimating the future income stream of the business and discounting
it to present value.29 More recently, this view has been criticized
in the literature, 30 but to the extent it has validity, at least for
some cases, it detracts from the meaningfulness of our results.
Our interviews with attorneys covered a wide range of topics,
but each interview focused especially upon the reasons the parties
chose to settle and the factors that influenced the terms of the
settlement. In every case, we interviewed at least two, and usually
more than two, attorneys who participated in the plan negotiations.
By comparing the answers received from different negotiation
participants, we were able to make judgments about the accuracy of
the information.
IV. CASE OUTCOMES: THE FREQUENCY OF SETTLEMENT
Whether a large bankruptcy reorganization case has been
"settled" is frequently a matter of interpretation. One might
consider a case settled only if all of the thousands of creditors and
shareholders involved affirmatively agreed to the terms of the plan,
by voting or otherwise. Such a settlement is improbable. At the
other extreme, most bankruptcy lawyers would consider a case
"settled" if no major participant, such as an official committee or
lead bank, came to the hearing and actively opposed confirmation.
A number of other possible definitions of "settled" lie between
these extremes. For example, one might consider a case settled if
the creditors' and equity committees approved the plan by majority
vote. Most pertinent to the present study, one might consider a
case settled if all impaired classes accepted the plan by vote of the
29 See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Baer, 651 F.2d 1341, 1347-48 (10th Cir. 1980) ("With
a newly reorganized company coming from the throes of bankruptcy, the actual market
value of a share of stock may be considerably less than the pro rata portion of the
going-concern value of the company represented by that stock."); In re Equity Funding
Corp. of Am., 391 F. Supp. 768, 773 (C.D. Cal. 1975) ("Instead, reorganization value is
intended to approach the value that would prevail in a perfect market adequately
stocked with willing and informed buyers and sellers."); Blum, The Law and Language
of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 565, 571-80 (1950) (indicating that, in
calculating reorganization value, future conditions must be taken into account).
30 See, e.g., Roe, supra note 1, at 559-70 (suggesting through empirical evidence that
a reorganized firm's securities are not systematically undervalued).
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requisite majorities, thus avoiding the necessity for a cram down
hearing.
Table I shows the number of official committees appointed in
each case, and whether those committees agreed to the plan which
was finally confirmed by the court.
As shown in Table I, in no case was a plan confirmed without
the approval of at least a majority of the members of the creditors'
committee. In only two of twenty-two cases (9%) in which an equity
committee existed at confirmation did the proponent of a successful
plan push forward to confirmation without securing the agreement
of the equity committee as well.
Table II shows the level of settlement in these cases by two
additional measures: (1) Were there any impaired classes of
creditors or shareholders who did not vote in favor of the plan?;
and (2) Did those classes actively oppose confirmation? If a class
receives nothing under a proposed plan, it is deemed to object, and
no vote is taken.3 1 In Table II those classes are listed as not voting
in favor of the plan, but there is a lowercase "a" to indicate that no
vote was actually taken.
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 1 1 26 (g) (1988).
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TABLE I
LEVEL OF COMMITTEE ACCEPTANCE OF TERMS OF CONFIRMED PLANS
Number of Number of Committees
Official Official Failing
Creditors' Equity to Approve
Name of Case Committees Committees the Plan
Air Florida 2 none none
AM International 1 none none
Amarex 2 none none
Anglo Energy 2 1 none
Baldwin-United 2 1 none
Braniff 5 1 none
Charter 2 1 none
Combustion Equipment 4 1 none
Continental Airlines 3 none none
Cook United 2 1 none
Crystal Oil 1 none none
Dreco 2 1 none
Energetics 1 none none
EPIC none 1 none
Evans Products 3 1 equity
FSC 2 1 none
HRT 1 1 equity
Itel 2 none none
Johns-Manville Corp. 8 none nonea
KDT 1 none none
Lionel 1 1 none
Marion 1 1 none
McLouth 1 none none
MGF 1 none none
NuCorp 1 none none
Oxoco 1 none none
Penn-Dixie 2 1 none
Phoenix Steel 1 none none
Pizza Time Theatre 1 none none
Revere 1 1 none
Salant 1 1 none
Sambo's Restaurants 1 none none
Saxon 2 1 none
Seatrain Lines 2 none none
Smith International 1 1 none
Storage Technology 1 none none
Tacoma Boatbuilding 2 none none
Technical Equities 1 none none
Towle 1 1 none
Towner 1 none none
White Motor 1 1 none
Wickes 2 1 none
Wilson Foods 2 1 none
TOTAL 75 22 22
1 In the Manville case, before confirmation, the court disbanded two official equity
committees that voiced opposition to the plan.
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16 sec. fraud none
3 none none
377 21 3
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' These are classes deemed to have rejected the plan without votingbecause they
would receive nothing under the plan. "Sec. fraud" refers to security fraud claims.
b Halliburton was a secured creditor.
C "L. Partners" refers to a class of limited partnership interests.
d There were nearly 200 technically separate classes of "Class A" secured
creditors in this case totalling about $12 million. Those classes have been disregarded
for the purpose of this table because no reliable ihformation is available as to the
numbers failing to agree or actually contesting cram down. Their inclusion would not
materially affect the level of agreement shown on this table. The claims of all these
classes totalled only about $12 million, the large majority of these classes agreed to
the plan and none of the dissidents was aggressive enough at confirmation to be
remembered by the lawyers we interviewed.
Table II shows a remarkably high level of plan acceptance. Only
twenty-one of 377 classes (5.6%) did not vote in favor of the plan.
Of these twenty-one, seventeen did not vote at all because they were
to receive nothing under the plan and hence were deemed to object.
As shown in the last column of Table II, only three of the 377
classes of creditors or shareholders (0.8%) actively contested
confirmation of a plan.
Together, these tables demonstrate an extraordinarily high level
of settlement. This finding is consistent with the comments of
bankruptcy practitioners that "the underlying philosophy of chapter
11 is to force settlement."3 2 Practitioners generally state that a
contested cram down hearing would be too complicated and too
time consuming. Whether that is a realistic fear will be the subject
of later comment in this Article.
V. THE TERMS OF SETTLEMENT: INSOLVENT DEBTORS
Our primary focus in this Article has been on distributions to
unsecured creditors and shareholders. We were able to calculate a
dollar value for these distributions for all but two of the cases in our
study, using the methodology described in Part HI. 33 Table III
reports these figures for the thirty companies that were insolvent at
the time of plan confirmation. We classified a company as
"insolvent" if the total value of the distributions to unsecured
creditors and shareholders was less than the estimated claims of the
unsecured creditors. Table III orders the cases by the percentage
of claims paid to unsecured creditors.
32 Broude, sura note 15, at 450.
33 In the remaining cases, Phoenix Steel and EPIC, some distributions were of a
nature that made reasonably accurate valuation impossible.
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TABLE III
INSOLVENTa DEBTORS: ADHERENCE TO THE ABSOLUTE
PRIORITY RULE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total
Percentage Distribution,
Paid on Distribution Unsecureds Equity
Unsecured to Equity and Equity (3) as % Committee
Name of Case Claimsb (in millions) (in millions) of (4) Appointed?
Seatrain Lines 0.5% $0C $1.4 0 No
MGF 1.1% 0 2.0 0 No
Towner 2.5% 0 3.2 0 No
Air Florida 3.1% 0C 6.0 0 No
Braniff 4.9% 1.7 35.4 4.9% Yes
Amarex 7.8% 0 18.5 0 No
Oxoco 9.5% 0.4 11.2 4.0% No
Technical Equitiesd 11.0% 0 6.6 0 No
Sambo's' 11.0% 0 unknown 0 No
Dreco f  11.7% 6.5 11.2 57.7% Yes
NuCorp 13.4% 0 39.2 0 No
McLouth 18.2% 1.4 27.2 5.1% No
Pizza Time Theatre 20.0% 0.5 23.0 2.2% No
Crystal Oil 23.9% 3.9 52.7 7.5% No
Evans Productsg 26.5% 0 2.4 0 Yes
Combustion Equip. 27.7% 0.4 37.4 1.0% Yes
Energetics 29.9% 3.0 14.5 20.8% No
Tacoma Boat 29.6% 2.5 40.7 6.1% No
Towle 35.6% 1.0 20.4 5.0% Yes
FSC 37.6% 1.9 40.2 4.8% Yes
Cook United 38.7% 2.3 28.1 8.1% Yes
Marion 40.4% 0.9 60.9 1.5% Yes
Saxon 41.2% 8.2 140.2 5.8% Yes
Baldwin-United h  54.3% 20.0 259.1 4.8% Yes
White Motor 60.9% 4.7 178.4 2.6% Yes
KDT 62.6% 3.2 42.6 7.4% No
Anglo Energy 64.6% 4.6 99.5 4.6% Yes
Itel 64.9% 18.2 652.8 2.8% No
HRT 68.5% 5.7 84.9 6.7% Yes
Wickes 81.6% 63.0 1,100.4 5.7% Yes
'A debtor was considered "insolvent" if the total value distributed to unsecured
creditors and shareholders was less than the allowed unsecured claims.
b In determining the percentage of unsecured claims paid, classes were omitted
if the amounts of claims in the class were in substantial dispute. Distributions to the
classes omitted were not substantial for any of the cases on this table. In determining
the total amounts distributed to unsecured claims, these same classes were included.
C Equity received property under the plan, but the property was of inconsequen-
tial value.
d The figure used for distribution to creditors is a rough estimate of a
distribution not yet made.
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'In the Sambo's Restaurants case, the final distribution is not complete, but we
have what we consider to be a reliable estimate of the percent of unsecured claims
to be paid from the attorney for the trustee.
' In the Dreco Energy case, insiders, who constituted management at filing,
controlled 75% of the shares. They were able to secure a very favorable distribution
to equity in part because their continued participation in the company was considered
critical to its future success.
9 The distributions shown here were made to creditors of Evans Products, Inc.,
the parent company whose shares were publicly held. A total of $175.3 million was
distributed to all creditors of the subsidiaries. On the average, unsecured creditors
of corporations in the group recovered 80.9% of their claims.. h In the Baldwin-United case, a major payout ($170 million) was made to
rehabilitation funds established by two state insurance commissioners for the benefit
of purchasers of single premium deferred annuities from Baldwin. We did not
include this payout as a distribution to unsecured creditors because at the time of the
bankruptcy filing, the rehabilitation funds held security interests in the stock of most
of Baldwin's subsidiaries. These security interests were released with the filing.
However, the payout was in full settlement of the annuitant's claims, including the
unsecured portion. If we included this payout as part of the distribution to
unsecured's, then the percentage distribution to equity would be reduced to 4.6%.
Three observations are apparent from Table III. First, though
each of these companies was insolvent, in twenty-one of the thirty
cases, creditors agreed to allow shareholder recoveries ranging from
$400,000 to $63 million.
Second, of the nine cases in which equity received nothing, eight
were cases in which unsecured creditors recovered less than 14% of
their claims. With the sole exception of Evans Products, which will
be discussed below, if creditors recovered at least 14% of the claims,
equity was permitted to share in the distribution.
Third, in the cases in which creditors received more than 14%
of their claims, there was no obvious relationship between the
percentage of claims recovered by creditors and the size of the
distribution to equity. This conclusion is evident from the fifth col-
umn of Table III. Certainly it is not possible to conclude that as the
size of the distribution to unsecured creditors increased, the
proportionate distribution to equity increased as well. We will
explain the reasons for these phenomena in the order they are
expressed above.
A. Why Does Equity Share in the Distribution?
In our interviews with the lawyers who conducted the negotia-
tions in these cases, we asked why equity was permitted to share in
the distributions. Only one attorney, who represented an equity
committee, asserted that equity had any right to share under the
absolute priority rule. Other participants in the same case dis-
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agreed and attributed the distribution to other factors. In a few
other cases, negotiations were conducted with the expectation that
there might be a contest over equity's right to share in the distribu-
tion, but in none were they conducted with any real doubt as to who
would win this contest. We have concluded that the creditors'
agreements to the equity distributions listed in Table III were in no
significant part the reflection of either real or supposed legal
entitlements.
In describing why creditors approved these distributions to
equity, the attorneys reported that "consensual plans" were highly
desirable and that to obtain those consents "everybody has to get
something." Several referred to the equity distributions as the
"price of peace."3 4  Clearly, the conventional wisdom was that
contested cram down hearings were to be avoided.
The expense of litigating the value of the company was cited by
many interviewees as a reason for allowing equity to share in the
distribution.3 5 In most of these cases, however, the expense of
litigating the issue of valuation probably would have been only a
fraction of the distribution. made to equity. To be entitled to cram
down a plan that provided no share to equity, the proponents would
only have had to prove that no creditor class was receiving more
than its valid claims. As noted above, in most of these cases, this
was obvious to all concerned.
There is no reason to believe that it would have been difficult to
prove this obvious fact had the plan proponents chosen to do so.
In three of the forty-three cases in our study (7%), the debtor
pushed a plan to confirmation despite the fact that an active,
aggressive group of equity holders opposed it. From the creditors'
point of view, Evans Products presented the most difficult valuation
situation-a sprawling corporate group with numerous subsidiaries
bordering on solvency.3 6 When bargaining broke down between
the creditors and Victor Posner, the controlling shareholder, the
3 A similar view was reflected in one interviewee's report that the distribution was
the product of the new investor's "business philosophy" of avoiding "confrontation."
See also Broude, supra note 15, at 454 ("Valuation of the company is something
that sophisticated participants in any significant chapter 11 reorganization avidly desire
to avoid."); Fortgang & Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1061, 1125
(1985) ("Confirminga plan over the dissent of a class of stockholders requires what may
be the most difficult kind of valuation: the prediction of earnings.").
36 Though the holders of relatively small claims against the parent company
recovered only 26.5 cents per dollar, see supra Table III following note 33, all creditors
of corporations in the Evans Products group recovered an average of 80.9 cents on each
dollar of their claims.
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creditors withdrew a previous offer to the shareholders worth
approximately $18 million and proposed a plan that provided for no
distribution to equity. The creditors then pushed the zero payment
plan to a contested confirmation hearing. The court scheduled the
hearing for a single day and concluded it in that time. Expert
testimony was heard from each side regarding the values of the
various securities that would be issued pursuant to the plan. The
court, ruling that none of the twenty-one classes of creditors were
receiving more than full payment, crammed the zero payment plan
down against the shareholders. The decision was affirmed on the
shareholders' appeal.
In two other cases, Manville and HRT, debtors pushed plans to
confirmation despite opposition by active, aggressive equity commit-
tees. In both cases, the defense crumbled prior to the confirmation
hearing, and the plan was crammed down without opposition. The
Manville court disbanded the equity committee and refused to
appoint a replacement committee. Stripped of his client, the lawyer
for the equity committee resigned just prior to the confirmation
hearing.3 8 At the hearing, which lasted less than a day, the court
valued the company on the basis of uncontested evidence presented
by the debtor. Although the company was arguably solvent,3 9 and
bank and trade creditors received postpetition interest, and the
court determined that the company was insolvent and crammed the
plan down against shareholders.
37 See In re Evans Products, Co., 65 Bankr. 31 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986). Victor Posner,
the majority shareholder, controlled management and was quite unpopular with
creditors. The equity committee, representingshareholders other than Posner, accepted
the creditors' committee's original plan, but Posner, who held enough shares to block
approval, refused to go along. It is a speculative matter whether the court, in the
absence of these special facts, would have been so amenable to cram down after such
a limited evidentiary hearing. In principle, however, there is no reason why a court
should not rely on opinion evidence from investment bankers as a basis for confirming
a plan that provides equity with nothing.
-" The lawyer had a conflict of interest because the equity committee represented
both preferred and common shareholders and preferred shareholders favored the plan
while common shareholders opposed it. Negotiations to resolve the conflict were
unsuccessful.
" During plan negotiations, Manville was considered by the participants to be
solvent. On that basis, the trade and commercial creditors negotiated provisions of the
plan under which they would be paid pendency interest. By the time of confirmation,
the company's situation had deteriorated and the parties considered the company
insolvent even though they did not renegotiate the plan. That conclusion, however,
depended upon a number of assumptions which might have been (but were not)
attacked in the confirmation hearing.
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In HRT, the debtor was obviously insolvent. The equity
committee opposed the sale of a 55% interest in the company at
what they believed to be :an inadequate price, apparently on the
theory that a larger distribution could be made to equity if a better
price were obtained, even though at any plausible sale price the
creditors would still receive less than full payment. The committee
chose neither to appear nor to submit evidence at the confirmation
hearing,40 and the plan was confirmed after a short hearing at
which the debtor's expert testified that no creditor class would
receive more than full payment.
In several other cases, plans under which shareholders received
nothing were crammed down against unrepresented equity holders.
In these cases, as revealed in Table III, no equity committee was
appointed, no equity representative appeared in opposition to cram
down, and the confirmation hearings were inevitably brief. Cram
down was necessary in these cases because when a class receives
nothing under a plan, it is deemed to object, and no vote of class
members is taken.
4 1
While several of these cases have their own peculiar facts that
make generalizations difficult, taken together they suggest that in
the case of a clearly insolvent company, an attempt to cram down
a plan against equity is not likely to result in litigation expense
nearly as great as the distributions offered to equity in most of the
cases. The cram down hearing did not exceed one day in any of the
eleven cases in our study. This circumstance suggests that while the
direct expense of litigating to cram down may be a factor that
contributed to the distributions to equity, it was not a predominant
one.
4 2
40 Equity would not have been able to defeat the plan merely by proving that the
sale price was inadequate. Under the absolute priority rule, unsecured creditors, not
equity holders, would have been entitled to the benefit of a higher price. To defeat the
plan at the cram down hearing, equity would have had to prove that sale at an adequate
price would have yielded enough to pay creditors in full and leave more for equity than
they were to receive under the current plan. Equity could not have met this burden.
The equity committee had nonetheless pursued its objection to the proposed sale at the
hearing to approve the disclosure statement respecting the plan that was confirmed.
After failing to persuade the judge not to circulate the plan for a vote, the committee
concluded that further objection would have been futile.
41 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(g) (1982).
42 We anticipate that in a cram down proceeding involving a clearly insolvent
company, a court would make the requisite findings based on opinion testimony from
investment bankers. The court would be willing to enter a confirmation order for a
plan providing nothing to equity, based on a finding that the total value of distributions
to creditors is clearly less than the creditors' claims. The court would find it
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Considerations of timing and of the potential ability of active
equity interests to cause delay were often cited as important reasons
why creditor interests agreed to distributions to equity. Delay of
uncertain duration while either confirmation or collateral issues
were litigated could cause business losses far greater than equity's
share of the distribution. For example, in Braniff, HRT, and Saxon,
the essence of each plan was a sale of the business to a third party.
Delay might have caused the buyer to back out of the deal,
depriving the creditors of the substantial cash payments they
expected if the plan was approved and the sale consummated.
Delay also tends to increase the expenses of administration.
43
Additionally, negotiators may be pressured into quick agreement
by other factors. In Crystal Oil and Oxoco, for example, debtors
were rushing to obtain confirmation of their plans prior to the
effective date of a major tax change. In Wickes and Salant,
ambitious GEOs were anxious for their companies, laden with net
operating losses (NOLs), to emerge from chapter 11 so they could
begin acquiring other companies. The acquisitions would enable
the companies to make use of the NOLs, as well as realizing the
CEOs' ambitions of expanding the companies in size.
44
unnecessary to precisely valuate the creditor distributions. Commentators have noted
that a precise valuation would be very time consuming. See supra note 35. The view
expressed here is not stated elsewhere in the literature, but a similar point is made
about an analogous issue. Even if a class votes in favor of a plan, when an individual
creditor votes against the plan it can only be confirmed if the court finds that the
dissenting creditor will receive at least as much as the creditor would receive in a
liquidation. See supra note 11. A noted practitioner has observed that this statutory
requirement for a valuation-applicable to nearly all confirmations, not just cram
downs-rarely presents a problem because when "distributions under the plan dearly
exceed the ... minimum ... no formal valuation is necessary." Fortgang & Mayer,
supra note 35, at 1106 n.203.
13 Knowledgeable observers have noted a strong relationship between the length of
time a chapter 11 case remains open and the total expenses of administration. New
York BankruptcyJudge Burton Lifland made this point as a member of the panel of the
Debtors' and Creditors' Rights Section of the Association of American Law Schools at
the Association's annual meeting onJanuary 5,1990. These expenses ofadministration,
however, represent costs that a company would incur whether in or out of bankruptcy.
It is only the "extra" administration costs that should be included in any cost-benefit
calculation respecting a delay.
44 Contrary to many first impressions, the fact that unsecured creditors do not
receive interest during the pendency of a chapter 11 proceeding is not necessarily a
reason for creditors to be adverse to delay. Certainly creditors can invest their
distributions as soon as they receive them, but while the assets remain in the debtor's
possession they can also be invested, with the proceeds used in an insolvency case to
enhance the ultimate distribution to creditors. In these circumstances, the non-payment
of interest should make creditors adverse to delay only if they believe they can invest
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Although timing concerns undoubtedly account for some of the
concessions made to equity interests, 45 we doubt that equity
holders in the large majority of the cases studied had much ability
to delay confirmation. Once a plan has been drafted and filed, it
generally takes three to five months to obtain an order approving
the disclosure statement, -to offer creditors and equity holders the
opportunity to review the disclosure statement and vote on the plan,
and then to bring the matter before the court for a confirmation
hearing. These steps are required whether or not the representa-
tives of equity holders consent to the plan. While each may require
a little extra time if the case is contested, the difference is not likely
to be great and may be partly or completely offset by the time saved
by excluding the representatives of equity from plan negotiations,
an exclusion that could be effected if an early decision was made to
freeze out equity.
Nor are the representatives of equity likely to be able to cause
significant delay by litigating collateral matters, such as whether
bank debt should be subordinated.4 6 Most collateral issues would
not affect the distribution to equity, and equity would lack standing
to raise them.47  Furthermore, bankruptcy procedure is highly
flexible and the bankruptcy courts frequently schedule urgent
matters for hearing on relatively short notice. If collateral litigation
were likely to delay confirmation of the plan in a major case, a
bankruptcy court could, and most probably would, bring the
litigation to a speedy conclusion.
Thus, while we agree that both direct litigation costs and fear of
delay are factors that encourage plan proponents to include equity
the assets more productively than the debtor.
45 In Wickes, for example, the equity committee threatened to litigate a lender
liability claim against bank claimants. This threat may have partly accounted for a last
minute agreement to augment the distribution to equity previously proposed by
management and creditors.
16 See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988); Hass, Insights in Lender Liability: An A2gument for
Treating Controlling Creditors as Controlling Shareholders, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1321, 1330
n.34 (1987).
47 See, e.g., In re Evans Products, Co., 65 Bankr. 870, 874 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986)
(holding that appellants lacked standing to appeal those parts of the reorganization plan
that did not directly affect their interests); Holywell Corp. v. Bank of New York, 59
Bankr. 340, 349-50 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986) (finding that appellants lacked standing to
attack the validity of the overall reorganization plan because they were not injured
parties); In re Sweetwater, 57 Bankr. 743, 746 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (stating that "an
appellant who is appealing from a Bankruptcy Court order confirming a plan of
reorganization may challenge only those parts of the plan that directly, adversely, and
pecuniarily affect the appellant").
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in the distributions made by even clearly insolvent companies, we
believe that these factors are insufficient to explain the size of the
distributions to equity. We are persuaded that there are other more
important reasons why a distribution to equity has become the norm
in reorganizations in which creditors receive more than approxi-
mately 15% of their claims.
As has been reported in other studies, 48 in the reorganization
cases of small businesses in which managers are also the principal
shareholders, equity frequently dominates the bargain to such an
extent that the absolute priority rule is virtually stood on its head.
In such cases, the claims of creditors are compromised, but
shareholder-managers usually retain their shares without dilution.
The dependence of the business upon the continuing services of the
shareholder-manager is the primary bargaining leverage used to
accomplish this feat.49 The dependence may result from the need
to maintain personal relations with suppliers, customers, and key
employees, the need for unique services that only the shareholder-
manager can provide, or from the shareholder-manager's willingness
to work for less than the economy generally pays for such effort.
5 0
Unsecured creditors are willing to waive their right to priority in
order to create an incentive for the shareholder-manager to
continue her participation in the business. They realize that without
such participation, the business will fail, and the assets will be
liquidated for the benefit of the secured creditors, leaving nothing
for the unsecured creditors.
The need for continuing cooperation from particular managers
provided substantial leverage for the shareholder class in only one
of the large reorganization cases included in our study.5' In
'8 See Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control: A Case For Adoption of the Trustee Systen,
70 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 165-83 (1987) (discussing creditors' inability to effectively
negotiate their own treatment under chapter 11 reorganization plans); LoPucki, The
Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 57 AM.
BANKI. L.J. 247, 266-69 (1983) (finding that in chapter 11 reorganization proceedings
creditors' interests are often compromised while debtor-managers' interests remain
unimpaired); see also EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR THE U.S. TRUsTEES, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE,
AN EVALUATION OF THE U.S. TRUSTEE PILOT PROGRAM FOR BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRA-
TION 39-88, 297-302 (1983) (evaluating the U.S. Trustee pilot program in chapter 11
case administration).
49 See LoPucki, supra note 48, at 256.
50 See J.K. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PuBLic Puu'osE 71-77 (1973)
(describing such willingness to work as "self-exploitation").
51 In Dreco, management's leverage was the dominant factor in bringing about a
very substantial deviation from the absolute priority rule. The Pheasy group were major
shareholders. During the reorganization proceedings, this group was forced out of the
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general, particular managers of large companies are not as impor-
tant to the companies' survival as are the managers of small
companies. Their bargaining leverage does not derive from
irreplaceable contacts with customers and suppliers or knowledge
indispensable to the operation of the business. Although they do
offer managerial skills and abilities, for the large company there is
likely to be a pool of available talent willing to replace a dismissed
manager. In our study, managers who resigned were usually quickly
replaced by new managers, either from the lower ranks of the
debtor company or from an active market in executive talent.
Of course, that did not mean that managers of the companies in
our study had no leverage at all. Changes in management are
disruptive; new management needs time to become informed, and
that tends to delay the reorganization effort. Consequently,
managers who had good credentials, demonstrated success, and had
the confidence of the various parties to the reorganization were
regarded as important assets. The possibility that they might quit
gave them leverage in dealing with creditors. It is probable that
management also derived a bargaining advantage in dealing with
creditors from their superior access to information about the
business and from their ability either to cooperate with or to resist
the creditors' efforts to become informed as the reorganization
proceeded. Management also gained leverage from the extraordi-
nary powers granted to the "debtor-in-possession" 52 under the
Bankruptcy Code, probably most importantly the exclusive power
to propose a plan during the first 120 days of the case and during
such extensions as the court allows.
53
The leverage available to managers in large reorganization cases
is not necessarily exercised in favor of shareholders. In the large
majority of the cases in our study, managers and shareholders were
distinct groups. While managers usually owned some shares, their
self-interest could normally be better served, and at a lower cost to
creditors, in ways other than enhancing the distribution to share-
day-to-day management of production, but still actively participated in marketing for the
company. In addition, they still retained essential customer contacts without which the
company might not have been able to survive. They used their resulting leverage to
negotiate a $6.5 million distribution to equity, while the unsecured creditors had to
settle for $4.5 million, less than 12% of their claims.
52 Formally, the "debtor-in-possession" is the debtor corporation; as a practical
matter, it is the incumbent managers.53 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988). Extensions of exclusivity were typical in our sample
cases. See supra note 6.
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holders: they could seek higher salaries, bonuses, stock, or stock
options.54 Alternatively, they could seek to increase the size of the
company, to improve its liquidity, or to take it out of the reorgani-
zation proceeding sooner.55 Of course, this discussion assumes
that management is immune from normal corporate governance
processes, which might protect against such opportunism. In fact,
as discussed later in this Article, in a few cases shareholders were
able to utilize corporate governance processes to check management
behavior, but in others a court prevented shareholders from doing
so.
5 6
The questions of how much leverage management has in these
large cases and in whose interest it is used are questions of such
importance and complexity that we have reserved them for a
separate article based on this study. For now, suffice it to note that
in many of the reorganization plan negotiations studied, manage-
ment did propose that equity share in the distribution, and creditors
acquiesced. The view of some interviewees was that management
had a duty to use its leverage to ensure that equity shared in the
distribution. As one experienced practitioner put it: "If manage-
ment is satisfactory to creditors and the creditors want management
to continue, they must let management give something to equity."
We have concluded that this protection by managers was an
important reason why such distributions were made in several of the
cases in our study.
57
Management's ability to obtain a distribution for equity was
enhanced when the amount to be received by equity was small in
relation to the amounts to be distributed to unsecured creditors, as
4 To put it more crassly, if creditors decide to offer management a "bribe" in order
to secure a reorganization plan to their liking, it is much cheaper to offer that "bribe"
in the form of advantageous employment terms (including generous severance
benefits-a "golden parachute") than in the form of a distribution to the equity class,
only a small part of which will get to management. See, e.g., HRT, Inc. (managers
sought golden parachutes as part of a plan for arms-length sale of the business);
McLouth Steel, Inc. (new managers soughtbonuses a few months after they were hired);
Wickes Companies, Inc. (turnaround managers soughtimproved employment contracts
during plan negotiations).
0 In Wickes Companies and Salant, strong incumbent managers took their
companies out of chapter 11 at the earliest possible dates, in part to satisfy a personal
preference to begin acquisition programs that would expand their companies in size.
56 See infra text accompanying notes 79-80. It is now settled that the bankruptcy
court has some discretion to enjoin shareholder meetings during the course of a chapter
11 proceeding. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d 60, 64-69 (2d Cir. 1986).
57 In other cases, however, management made no effort to benefit shareholders,
instead, it employed its leverage for other purposes.
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it normally was. 58  The impact of allowing equity to share was
spread among numerous unsecured creditors. Many interviewees
considered this impact spreading to be an important explanation for
the creditors' decision to permit equity to share in the distribution.
They pointed out that no individual creditor would gain enough by
freezing out equity to make it profitable to invest its own resources
in resisting the distribution to equity proposed by management.
The creditors' committee may also be unwilling to go to war over an
issue that is not pushed by any one of its constituents. While the
unsecured creditors' committee is supposed to represent class
interests, which are substantial when the proposed equity distribu-
tion is valued in absolute dollar terms,59 it may be primarily
concerned with issues considered to be even more important, such
as the timing of the case or what proportion of cash, debt instru-
ments, and shares the creditors will receive.
In a few of the cases in our study, interviewees reported that
allowing equity to share in the distribution helped to maintain a
market for the company's equity securities. In Anglo Energy, for
example, there were only eight creditors, all large banks with large
claims. 60 By allowing shareholders to retain a part of the equity
in the reorganized company, the creditors, who received the major
portion of the new shares, sought to ensure that the new shares
would be publicly traded and thereby enhanced in value.
61
It was suggested in some of our interviews that a company has
public relations reasons to prefer a consensual plan. Most reorga-
nizing companies have been the subject of dissension and controver-
sy. If the various interests visibly "make peace," it may help to
convince customers, suppliers, and most importantly potential
future lenders that the company's problems have been resolved to
everyone's satisfaction and that the company has rebounded from
its crisis.
To what we suspect will be the surprise of some readers, taxes
were not an important reason for distributions to equity in our
58 See supra Table III following note 33.
59 As Table III indicates, the distribution typically measures in the millions of
dollars. See id.
60 In this case, only the first level subsidiary filed for bankruptcy. All the company's
operations were conducted through lower level subsidiaries, which remained solvent.
Consequently, there were no trade creditors, only lenders, involved in this bankruptcy.
61 Tacoma Boatbuilding and Crystal Oil were other cases in which we believe that
this motive of maintaining a public market for reorganization securities partly explains
the distribution to equity.
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cases. The preservation of net operating loss carryovers (NOLs) for
future use is a central tax concern in large chapter 11 proceedings.
These tax benefits; however, were rarely affected by whether or not
equity shared in the distribution.
62
62 There are two principal ways in which NOLs can be lost in a bankruptcy
reorganization: (1) if the restructuring of the corporate entity results in recognition of
income that absorbs NOLs or, in the case of income from debt cancellation, direct
reduction of NOLs; and (2) if provisions limiting the transferability of NOLs apply to
prevent the restructured corporation from using the NOLs built up before the
restructuring.
The recognition of income from debt cancellation can be avoided, however, under
the well established stock-for-debt exception. This is an exception, applicable in all
bankruptcy cases or outside bankruptcy when the debtor corporation is insolvent, to the
general rule that cancellation of debt results in income that is either taxable or reduces
tax attributes such as NOLs. See I.R.G. § 108 (1988). This exception creates a tax
incentive for the debtor to distribute shares of the reorganized company to creditors
of the old company. Indeed, it is important that stock exchanged for debt be more
than "nominal or token" shares, or the exception may not apply. See I.R.C.
§ 108(e)(8)(A) (1988); Shakow, United States Steel and Kirby Lumber: Another View, 42
TAX NOTES 1371, 1373 (1989).
Avoidingincome to the debtor corporation in abankruptcy reorganization because
of what is deemed a transfer of assets from one corporate entity to another is not
difficult. Most reorganizations will qualify as "E" reorganizations under corporate tax
laws, which exempts the transaction from such tax consequences. Tax law's "continuity
of interest" rule, requiring that old security holders (including long term debt holders)
maintain a substantial interest in the new corporation, has no applicability to an "E"
reorganization.
The major legal problem faced by a reorganizing corporation with regard to
preservation of NOLs is presented by I.R.C. § 382 (1988). This section was completely
rewritten in 1986. With respect to corporations in chapter 11, the new rules apply only
to corporations that filed bankruptcy after August 14, 1986 and had a plan confirmed
on or afterJanuary 1, 1987. Hence, the "old" rules apply to most of the companies in
our study.
Under the old rules, if the only creditors receiving shares held long term debt
(roughly five years or more in duration), the reorganization was exempt from § 382.
Trade and bank creditors generally held short term debt, however. Where they received
shares, to avoid application of old § 382 (which eliminated NOLs entirely) it was
necessary to ensure either that no group often such creditors received as much as 50%
of the reorganized company's stock or that the company did not change its businesses
over a time period that varied from case to case but was generally between one and two
years. Generally it was possible to take advantage of one or the other qualification for
avoiding application of § 382, and in neither case was it necessary to give any
reorganization shares to old equity. In a rare case, where the creditor class was small
or dominated by one large creditor, it might have been desirable to distribute new
shares to old equity in order to avoid distributing 50% of the shares to any group often
creditors.
Under the post-1986 rules, § 382 will often limit the use of NOLs after a
bankruptcy reorganization. The old ways for avoiding § 382 no longer exist. In some
circumstances, however, it will be possible to avoid § 382 by givingjust over 50% of the
reorganization shares to old shareholders, providing the distribution is accompanied by
a three year transfer restriction on the new shares. Moreover, there is a special elective
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Even when considered together, we do not think that the factors
of litigation expense, timing, managerial preferences, loss spreading,
public relations concerns, and the making of markets for the com-
pany's securities adequately explain the size of the payments made
to shareholders in the Table III cases. On the basis of our many
interviews with attorneys, we are convinced that these payments are
not negotiated solely in the shadow of adjudication. Rather, the
outcomes of these negotiations are significantly determined by the
social norms of the legal culture which has grown up around these
kinds of cases. The highly intermediated nature of the chapter 11
process provides bankruptcy lawyers, bankruptcy judges, turnaround
managers, and creditor representatives with a considerable degree
of independence from their constituencies.
In describing the chapter 11 process as "intermediated," we
mean that reorganization plans are not directly negotiated by the
parties in interest, but rather by intermediaries functioning as the
parties' representatives. The effects of intermediation are com-
pounded by perplexing layers of agency. For example, a public
bondholder may be represented in the chapter 11 case by an
indenture trustee, which is usually the trust department of a bank.
The bank may retain a member of a private law firm to conduct the
representation. If the indenture trustee is appointed to member-
ship on the unsecured creditors' committee, the lawyer may be the
one who attends the meetings. The committee will retain a
bankruptcy lawyer to represent itself in negotiations with the debtor
and the representatives of shareholders.
We observed many variations in the agency structures that
pervade large chapter 11 proceedings. In some cases there were
subcommittees or executive committees of creditors' committees
and there was often more than one committee representing
different kinds of creditors. Some committees undertook to
represent their constituents, while others would be better described
rule for corporations in bankruptcy that will often be the most desirable option available
for coping with § 382. To qualify for this special election, it is necessary that 50% of
the post-confirmation shares be distributed to old equity and "historic" creditors,
defined as creditors who acquired their claims in the ordinary course of business or
held them for 18 months preceding filing. See I.R.C. § 382(l)(5) (1988). (A pending
proposed treasury regulation will, if adopted, impose a "continuity of business"
requirement on § 382(0(5) reorganizations, thereby limiting their desirability. 55 Fed.
Reg. 33,137 (1990) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed Aug. 13, 1990)). For
these reasons, under the new § 382 there will sometimes be a tax incentive in chapter
11 reorganizations to allow old equity to retain shares in the reorganized company.
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as forums in which their constituents struggled for power. Some
committees spoke through their attorneys, others spoke through
individual committee members, and still others spoke through some
combination of the two. Most of the committees represented
hundreds or thousands of constituents and very few were in a
position to consult with or poll a significant number of their
constituents.
Although creditors' committees represented all of the unsecured
creditors, typically the membership of the committees consisted
only of large creditors, and the committees were often dominated
by bank creditors. Committee attorneys, who often made a business
of representing creditors' committees, may have been responsive
primarily to the interests of the largest creditors. Ultimately, all
constituents could vote on the proposed plan of reorganization, but
the votes were typically mere formalities. Individual creditors were
rarely in a position to understand, much less question, the deals
entered into on their behalf.
The representation of shareholders was also highly intermediat-
ed. We were often told in interviews that management represented
shareholder interests, but the link is indirect. In large chapter 11
proceedings, shareholders might or might not be able to elect a
board of directors, 63 who then might or might not ensure that the
managers, or their lawyers, speak for shareholder interests in plan
negotiations. In addition, while shareholders were usually repre-
sented by an equity committee, the committee was usually com-
posed of a few small shareholders because they were the only ones
willing to serve. 64  The committee, in turn, hired a lawyer to
63 See In reJohns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 1986). The question of
when normal corporate governance processes can be altered for a firm in bankruptcy
will be discussed extensively in another article based on this research project. That
article will focus particularly on the role of management in large chapter 11 proceed-
ings.
6 Equity committees often fail to include major shareholders, who are concerned
about having to stop trading in the company's stock because of access to inside
information. The owners of shares of only nominal value or "gadflies" may be able to
form the equity committee as a consequence, and the intensity of their interest in the
proceeding is likely to be a function of their sense of duty or intellectual interest rather
than the amount of money they have at stake. There are indications that since the
period covered by our study, the reluctance of large institutional shareholders to serve
on committees may be dissipating. See Parker, Investors Gain Confidence in Activist Roles,
PENSION & INVESTMENT AGE, April 4, 1988, at 3.
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conduct the negotiations. Sometimes the equity committee met
regularly to provide guidance to the lawyer; at other times the
lawyer negotiated with little guidance from the client.
The intermediaries who negotiated reorganization plans were
not only representatives of the parties in interest, but also members
of professions, of independent firms, and of the. bankruptcy
community. They sometimes served interests related to these other
roles. For example, the lawyers who appeared in these cases were
mostly private practitioners who expected or hoped to be active
"repeat players" in similar cases in the future. In our study of forty-
three cases, fifteen firms obtained nearly half of the appointments
as principal attorney for the debtor, creditors' committee, or equity
committee. 65 These lawyers were likely to know the other lawyers
in the case, by reputation if not personally, and they expected that
they would be involved in other cases with them.
66
We concluded that the lawyers in the cases we studied had an
incentive to be concerned not only with the welfare of their clients
but also with their relationships to each other.6 7 Lawyers who act
unconventionally in a particular case may find it difficult to
negotiate effectively in future cases with the other lawyers.
Moreover, the other lawyers are likely to form and express opinions
about the quality of the lawyer's representation, and these opinions
may influence whether the lawyer obtains future clients. 68 For the
65 There were 111 representations by a law firm as principal lawyer for the debtor,
creditors' committee, or equity committee. Fifty-three of these representations, or 48%,
were by firms that made more than one representation of this nature in a case in our
study. These multiple representations were made by a total of fifteen firms. The
significance of this statistic is enhanced by the custom that key negotiations usually were
conducted by the head of the firm's bankruptcy department.66 See MacDonald & McLeod, Pictures Are Worth a Thousand Words: Understand-
ing the Chapter 11 Process Through Models and Simulations 25 (1989) (discussion draft
on file with authors) (estimating the size of the group of chapter 11 lawyers routinely
handling large cases as about 200-300 lawyers); see also id. at 107 n.116 (indicating that
rapid growth in the number of practitioners is putting great stress on old networks).
67 The position of attorney for the creditors' committee in large cases is lucrative
and highly coveted. We suspect that once one has landed the job, the pressure not to
make a mistake-or not to appear to-must be enormous. The safest course is to stick
to tradition, and in large reorganization cases the tradition is a consensual plan. This
practice is another reason why intermediaries may be so partial to consensual plans.
68 Social norms typically are enforced by ostracizing violators and these norms are
no exception. Some equity committees and subordinate debt holders were represented
by lawyers who did not adhere to the norms. Typically, these lawyers were retained by
clients who bought securities at a substantial discount after the debtor was in
bankruptcy. They raised technical legal issues which threatened to disrupt the flow of
the proceedings and sought better treatment for their clients than was provided under
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most part in a chapter 11 proceeding, an attorney's, colleagues will
expect an effort to reach a consensual plan. In this context, the
impracticality of cram down can be both a useful myth and a self-
fulfilling prophecy. To the extent that clients believe cram down to
be impossible, they avoid or discharge lawyers who might attempt
it, thereby enforcing the norm in favor of consensual plans and
undermining lawyers who might be inclined to attempt a cram
down.
The belief that reorganization can best be accomplished through
consensual plans is also shared by many bankruptcy judges. Those
judges can discourage litigation and encourage bargaining to a
consensual plan through a variety of means. When plan negotia-
tions in the Anglo Energy case seemed to be deadlocked, the judge
stopped approving interim payment of fees to the attorneys for both
the debtor and the creditors' committee. When the equity commit-
tee in the Manville case threatened to upset a tentative settlement
reached among all other major interests in the case, the judge
disbanded the committee. Probably the most important method,
however, concerns the extension of "exclusivity," the period during
which the debtor has the exclusive rjght to file a plan. So long as
the debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan and does not do so,
it is impossible for creditors or shareholders to litigate to a
resolution of the case. Some judges extend exclusivity only a few
months at a time69 and use the hearings on successive requests for
extension as opportunities to monitor the progress of negotiations
and the positions of the parties. When the judge in the Texaco
bankruptcy came to believe that the debtor might be preventing
agreement on a plan to which the other interests would subscribe,
the judge's implication that he was prepared to remove exclusivity
quickly led to an agreement.70
the norms. In our interviews, the establishment lawyers who usually represented
debtors and creditors' committees often expressed their dislike and their cbntempt for
those lawyers and their clients, referring to them as "spoilers," "crazies," "bottom
scrapers," "hold up artists," or "troublemakers." Some argued that exclusivity was
necessary to protect the responsible parties in the case from such interference. While
some of the outsiders achieved favorable results for their clients, from the attitudes
expressed, it seems likely to us that establishment attorneys rarely went out of their way
to make the outsiders look good, and indeed they might have acted collectively to make
the outsiders look bad.
69 See, e.g., In re Pine Run Trust, Inc., 67 Bankr. 432, 435 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986)
(granting a 90 day extension).
71 See Miller, Texaco, Inc.-An Unexpected Debtor Making Appropriate Use of the
Bankruptcy Code, in EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM OF THE 62ND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
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The bargaining in these cases does not take place solely in the
"shadow of the law." The outcome of bargaining is determined
partly by the prospective results of an adjudication but also to a
significant extent by an informal process by which intermediaries,
partly independent of their constituents and significantly dependent
upon each other, enforce a set of social and cultural norms within
their own ranks. The combination of independence from those they
represent and dependence on each other enables this group to act
in its own self interest. That self interest appears to be, in signifi-
cant part, to make the reorganization process function in a smooth,
predictable manner. The mechanism for achieving that function,
the consensual plan, is more costly because everyone at the
bargaining table must be given a share. But that cost is widely
shared among parties whose knowledge of the process and control
over it is limited by the intermediation. An individual who held the
entire creditor position in any of these cases might well have
decided to attempt a contested cram down against equity,71 and
we believe such an individual would usually have succeeded. Due
importantly to the highly intermediated nature of creditors'
positions in these cases, however, creditors have commonly allowed
otherwise virtually powerless equity interests to share in the
distribution.
B. Why is Equity Sometimes Frozen out of the Distribution?
Despite the pressures toward settlement, there were nine cases
in which equity did not share in the distribution. Attorneys in those
cases, with the exception of the Evans Products case, told us that
equity was excluded because the debtors were insolvent and the
equity interests were so far "underwater" that they clearly had no
entitlement. Unsecured creditors in those cases recovered less than
fourteen cents on the dollar. Only in the highly unusual circum-
stances of the Evans Products case did unsecured creditors achieve
a substantial recovery without permitting equity holders a share.
The lawyers' explanation fails to account for the distribution to
equity in Braniff, Oxoco, and Dreco-three other cases in which
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BANKRuIPTcYJUDGES 5, 13-15 (1988).
71 Without the agreement of creditors to a distribution to equity, the only legally
confirmable plan in such a case would be a plan that offered nothing to equity. If
management would not propose such a plan, the creditors might attempt to replace
them with management who would, or they might simply declare an impasse in the
bargaining and seek to lift exclusivity.
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creditors recovered less than fifteen cents on the dollar.72 An
adequate explanation of the zero payment cases must also include
lack of "presence at the bargaining table"; our data indicates that
equity shares in the distribution when their interests are represent-
ed in the bargaining process, no matter how little creditors recover.
One way equity interests may be "present at the bargaining
table" is through an official committee of equity holders. Column
6 of Table III indicates the presence or absence of such a committee
in each of the cases. A comparison of columns 3 and 6 of that table
reveals that, with the single exception of the Evans Products case,
when an equity committee organized and retained counsel, equity
shared in the distribution. Even in the Evans Products case, the
creditors' committee at one time agreed to a plan under which
equity would have received stock worth more than $18 million,
though the plan ultimately confirmed provided nothing for
equity.73 Thus, in every case in which an equity committee was
appointed, creditors at least offered equity holders a share in the
distribution, regardless of how far "underwater" the equity interests
were.
In one of the low payout cases, Oxoco, and in several cases in
which creditors received a only marginally greater amount, equity
received a share of the distribution despite the absence of an equity
committee. Based on our interviews with attorneys in the cases, we
attribute most of these recoveries to management's advocacy of a
distribution to equity. As indicated in the preceding section, if
management holds out for a distribution to equity, it usually will
succeed. Hence, equity can obtain "presence at the bargaining
table" through representation by management.
Two of the nine cases in which equity received nothing, Seatrain
Lines and Air Florida, further attest to the vulnerability of unrepre-
sented equity interests. In those cases, the equity class was
ostensibly offered a share in the distribution, and the requisite
majorities of shareholders voted in favor of the plan, thereby
avoiding the necessity of a cram down. In each of the cases,
however, the distribution to equity was in fact worthless. It
consisted of warrants to buy stock in the emerging company-but at
72 See supra Table HI following note 33. Phoenix Steel, one of the cases that we
could not value, was also a case in which creditors received less than 15 cents on the
dollar, yet equity received something.
73 The circumstances which led to this result are explained supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
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a price far above the reasonably projected market value of the
stock.7 4 There were no similar occurrences in any case in which
an equity committee existed.
In five low payout cases in which equity did not have representa-
tion,75 there were subordinated classes of creditors who were
entitled to priority over equity. In several of these cases, the
subdebt was as hopelessly underwater as the equity interests.
76
Nonetheless, in each case subdebt was permitted to share in the
distribution. In fact, in none of the cases in our study was a class
of subordinated creditors frozen out of the distribution.
We think the most important reason7 7 why subordinated debt
always received a distribution was its presence at the bargaining
table in every case observed. Subdebt invariably was a debenture
issue represented by an indenture trustee. Typically, this trustee
was appointed to the unsecured creditors' committee. In some
cases in our study, investors acquired substantial holdings in the
subdebt and then participated in the case to protect their invest-
ment. Through the efforts of such investors, subordinated debt
holders sometimes won the appointment of independent, official
committees to represent their position. Even if subdebt holders did
not obtain representation at the bargaining table in one of these
ways, they did not go unrepresented. In every case except EPIC, an
unsecured creditors' committee was appointed, organized, and
represented by lawyers. Those committees and their lawyers had a
fiduciary obligation to represent all unsecured creditors not
otherwise represented, which necessarily included the subdebt.
74 In the Air Florida case, for example, the warrants were to buy stock at $2.40 a
share. The disclosure statement gave no indication as to the value of the shares, which
would not trade until after confirmation. The stock began trading at 10 cents a share.
Participants in the negotiations were aware that the warrants were virtually worthless
and expressed surprise that equity holders nevertheless voted in favor of the plan.
75 Seatrain, Amarex, MFG, Nucorp, and Pizza Time.
76 In some of the cases, legitimate legal questions arose about the validity of the
subordination agreement. In Nucorp, for example, there was a relatively small amount
of general unsecured debt. The major creditors were banks who claimed to be secured,
and subdebt. Subdebt had plausible fraudulent conveyance and equitable subordination
claims against the banks. The distribution to subdebt can be viewed as a compromise
of those claims.
77 Taxes may also explain distributions to subdebt. A general tax principle holds
that discharge of indebtedness is income. The equity-for-debt exception preserves the
corporation's NOLs by giving subdebt some reorganization securities. See supra note
62. This reason appears to have been determinative of the distribution to subdebt in
MGF.
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C. How Much Does Equity Get?
We could discern no pattern in the distribution amounts to
shareholders in the cases of clearly insolvent companies. Although
the data in Table III shows that equity is more likely to share in the
distribution when creditors are recovering a larger percentage of
their claims, it does not appear that equity's proportionate share of
the distribution increases with the percentage recovered by
creditors. This is consistent with what we were told in interviews.
None of our interviewees described equity's share of the distribu-
tion as being the product of a financial calculation. Nor could they
suggest any formula that would relate equity's share to the absolute
priority rule, the percentages recovered by creditors, or other
variables.
We believe equity's share of the distribution was determined by
the bargaining leverage of the different parties and by their
representatives' skill in exploiting that leverage. In a typical case,
management proposed that a particular percentage of the shares of
the new company go to equity. Aggressive representatives of equity
frequently sought to increase that percentage, and were sometimes
successful. A variety of tactics were employed. For example, if
others wanted the case to move quickly, equity might threaten delay.
Other tactics by equity included: combing through the financial
affairs of the company looking for matters to litigate; bringing in
prospective purchasers for the company who talked high prices even
if they made no commitments; or threatening to oppose confir-
mation by presenting evidence on the issue of valuation. Creditors
sometimes retaliated by threatening to cram down a zero payment
plan. 78  Ultimately, the parties assessed the credibility of the
various leverages, engaged in a fair amount of bluffing, and arrived
at a figure.
A tactic that proved especially effective in increasing equity's
leverage was to call a meeting of shareholders for the avowed
purpose of ousting management and installing replacements who
would propose a larger share for equity. For example, in Saxon
Industries, all parties knew that the company was clearly insolvent.
Early in the proceeding the parties reached a consensus to sell
Saxon's assets to an outside buyer. The equity committee, repre-
78 If continuation of the chapter 11 depended upon continued interim lending
(called chapter financing), the creditors' bargaining position was strengthened since the
creditors often provided this additional lending.
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sented by a large, well-respected New York law firm, objected
strenuously to the buyer selected by management and the creditors'
committee. The committee unsuccessfully pressed these objections
in the bankruptcy court. In parallel litigation in the Delaware state
courts, however, the equity committee obtained an order requiring
Saxon to hold a shareholders' meeting.79 The committee immedi-
ately announced its intention to launch a proxy campaign to
displace management. In response, the prospective buyer threat-
ened to withdraw unless a consensual plan was quickly confirmed.
Fearing that they would be unable to find another buyer at a
comparable price, the creditors' committee and management
offered to increase equity's distribution to nearly twice what had
been previously offered. The offer was accepted, a consensual plan
was quickly confirmed, and the shareholders' meeting was never
held. °
Among the most important changes during the 1980s in the
reorganization process of large, publicly held companies was a
dramatic improvement in the market for claims against such
companies. While registered stocks and bonds of reorganizing
companies have long been traded, today even the claims of bank
creditors and suppliers trade actively.
8 1
The purchasers typically are investors who believe they can make
a profit by buying the claims and shares for less than they will yield
after confirmation of a reorganization plan. Some of these investors
buy substantial holdings in a particular creditor class. They then
use those holdings to participate aggressively in the reorganization
case, either as a committee member representing that class's
position or as a holder of claims whose votes will be necessary if
that class is to approve the plan. By acquiring a large amount of
claims that will be exchanged for stock as part of the plan, an
investor might even gain control of the emerging company.
8 2
79 See Saxon Indus. v. NKFW Partners, 488 A.2d 1298, 1299 (Del. 1984).
80 For an account of this case by the attorneys for the equity committee, see Radick
& Blauner, Shareholders, Unitet, BARRONS, Apr. 14, 1986, at 22. Consistent with our
thesis, the authors argue that equity will fare better in a reorganization plan if an equity
committee is formed and it acts aggressively. See id. at 24.81 Recently, a bankruptcy newsletter began quoting the "going rates" for trade debt
in major cases. See The Supplemen, TURNAROUNDs & WoRKouTs, Apr. 15, 1990, at 2.
See generally Note, Post-petition Trading in Chapter 11 Claims: A Call For Augmentation of
Federal Rule of Bankrupty Procedue 3001(e)(2), 58 FoRD. L. REv. 1053 (1990).
82 See Pauly, Friday & Adams, SifingAshes on Wall Stree NEWSWEEK, Sept. 4, 1989,
at 42-43; Martin, The None-Too-Gentle Art of the 'Bankruptcy Boys,'N.Y. Times, July 18,
1988, at D1, col. 4; Wallace, Investors Await a Rash of Defaults, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1988,
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The improvements in these markets means that there is an
increased likelihood that a class of claims will obtain aggressive
representation and thereby fully exploit its potential leverage in the
bargaining process. If claims such as publicly held debentures are
widely dispersed, no one holder may have the incentive to ensure
that the interests of the class are fully asserted.83 By. aggregating
the claims, an investor acquires an interest sufficient to warrant
exploitation of the bargaining leverages of the class and the
realization of its potential under the reorganization plan.
Saxon Industries provides an excellent example of this process.
In that case, several debenture issues were outstanding at the time
of bankruptcy. An investor purchased a majority position in two of
these issues on the public market. After successfully moving for
appointment of a separate committee to represent subdebt, the
investor was appointed chair of that committee and proceeded to
develop a plausible fraudulent conveyance claim against major bank
creditors.8 4 This claim was never litigated, but it provided the
leverage enabling subdebt holders to receive a distribution of about
32% of their claims, while senior bank creditors only received about
45%. Of course, the investor made a considerable profit.
Similarly, in the Wilson Foods case, the debtor proposed in its
initial reorganization plan to leave a bond issue unimpaired. 5
This treatment was disadvantageous to the bondholders because the
at 35, col. 3; Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations
in Chapter 11, at 1, 1-2 (Aug. 29, 1988) (unpublished monograph on file with the
authors).
83 In the case of publicly held debt, the indenture trustee could play this role.
Indenture trustees are usually members of the relevant creditors' committees, though
sometimes in a non-voting capacity. They vary considerably in their enthusiasm for
aggressive bargaining, however. Many indenture trustees refuse to participate in the
bargaining or to offer an opinion on any proposed plan, positing that their role is to
ensure that the proceedings are formally correct and that the debenture holders
themselves must vote to approve the financial deal offered. For a discussion of the role
of indenture trustees in chapter 11 proceedings, see Dunham & Borowitz, The Role of
the Indenture Trustee in Reorganization Cases Under the Bankruptcy Code, 102 BANKING L.J.
436 (1985).
84 The claim was based on the merger of subsidiaries into the parent many years
before filing. A subsidiary had issued the debentures; the claim was that but for the
merger, the subsidiary would still be solvent and even subdebt would be fully paid. The
merger enabled the bank creditors of the parent to claim, under the subordination
clause, assets that would otherwise have gone to subdebt.
85 To leave a claim "unimpaired" means that any defaults are cured and that the
plan provides for payment of the claim according to its original contractual terms. In
the case of a bond, interest and principal payments would be made as scheduled in the
bond. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988).
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bonds carried a very low rate of interest, while other creditors were
being paid in full, including postpetition interest at a higher rate.
Aggressive investors bouht a position in the bonds, retained
counsel, and argued that the debtor had breached a restrictive
covenant in the bonds by granting security to a postpetition lender
during the bankruptcy case. The debtor settled with the investors
by increasing the interest rate on the bonds, substantially increasing
their market value.
For a variety of reasons, the development of markets for the
securities and claims against reorganizing firms has affected
primarily creditor classes, particularly subdebt. Investors have
shown much less interest in buying positions in the shares of
reorganizing debtors and helping to exploit equity's bargaining
position. One reason undoubtedly relates to the prospective value
of the distributions to the equity interests in insolvent debtors. This
value is often too small in absolute terms to justify the effort
involved in evaluating the shares for purchase, let alone participat-
ing in the case. As shown in Table III, in most of these cases the
entire equity interest ultimately recovered only a few million dollars.
Moreover, according to a study completed before the time period
we studied, the shares of firms about to file bankruptcy are often
overpriced.8 6 Undeveloped sources of bargaining leverage may
also have been more common among creditor classes, particularly
subdebt, than among equity classes. In the cases we studied, issues
were raised with surprising regularity about ambiguity in subordina-
tion clauses or about transactions between parents and subsidiaries
that were fraudulent as to particular debenture issues. If non-
frivolous, such legal claims have value in negotiations. They do not,
however, arise as frequently with respect to equity.
8 7
VI. THE TERMS OF SETTLEMENT: SOLVENT DEBTORS
Table IV(A) shows the values distributed to creditors and share-
holders in the cases of solvent debtors. The second column of
Table IV(A) shows the value available for distribution to unsecured
creditors and shareholders as a percentage of the allowed claims
owing to unsecured creditors at the time of the filing of the
86 See E. ALTMAN, CORPORATE BANKRuPTcY IN AMERICA 139-40 (1971).
87 One reason for this infrequency is that fraudulent conveyance and equitable
subordination claims only benefit equity when they are large enough to give equity the
right to participate in the distribution if the claims are sustained. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
BARGAINING OVER EQUITY'S SHARE
petition. In this column, a value of 100 indicates that the value
available for distribution was equal to the amount of the claims.
The number in column 2 is always at least 100 because only solvent
companies are included on this table.
If these cases had been adjudicated and the court had given the
distributions the same values we did, under the absolute priority
rule creditors would have been entitled to one hundred cents on the
dollar before equity became entitled to anything. The third and
fourth columns show how the value available actually was appor-
tioned between shareholders and creditors. Comparison of columns
2, 3, and 4 shows that when a company was only marginally solvent,
equity holders were able to capture a substantial portion of the
creditors' entitlements. Column 5 indicates the dollar amount of
"shortfall" to creditors resulting from lack of enforcement of the
absolute priority rule. Column 6 shows the total dollar value
recovered by equity holders.
A. Equitable Sharing Versus Absolute Priority
Although there are few cases, we think the data supports the
inference that there is an "equitable sharing" of the available values
in the reorganizations of marginally solvent companies, with
creditors taking the largest share. Based on our interviews, one
important reason why equity interests fare relatively well in these
cases is doubt about the value of the property being distributed to
creditors. When companies are marginally solvent, creditors
ordinarily receive substantial amounts of equity in the emerging
company. The current shareholders can argue that the property
being distributed to creditors is equal to the amounts of their claims
and they can credibly threaten to litigate if creditors ask for more.
Shareholders, however, do not rely solely on valuation argu-
ments to persuade creditors to "equitably share" the assets available
for distribution. In AM International, Charter, and Lionel, the
three cases in which sharing was most dramatic, management was
effectively controlled by shareholders8 8 and shielded by the
exclusivity rule. This situation placed creditors in a difficult
bargaining position. To enforce absolute priority through litigation,
a3 In the Lionel case, an aggressive equity committee won seats on the board by
forcing the election of new directors during the bankruptcy proceedings. In Charter,
the CEO was a relative of the controlling shareholder. In AM International, a 15%
shareholder was on the historically active board of directors and was one of three
members of the subcommittee that oversaw the bankruptcy proceeding.
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creditors first would have had to persuade the court that exclusivity
should be lifted, and then propose and win confirmation of their
own plan. Even so, their own plan would not have been confirm-
able if it provided them with more than the full amounts of their
claims, without interest during the pendency of the chapter 11
case.89 Due to the loss of interest during the delay associated with
later adjudication, this sum may have been worth less on a present
value basis than the amount management offered in the plan that
was confirmed. When management of a marginally solvent debtor
is firmly in equity's camp, and particularly when pendency interest
is unavailable, considerations of timing can be an especially
important reason for creditor concessions to equity.
90
TABLE IV(A)
SOLVENT DEBTORS: DEVIATION FROM THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULEa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cents per
Dollar of Cents per Unsecured Equity
Unsecured Dollar Paid Cents Creditor Holder
Claims to Unsecured Captured by Shortfall Recovery Equity
Case Name Available Creditors Equity (in millions) (in millions) Committee?
AM Int'l 100.3 86.1 14.2 $37.4 $38.5 No
Charterb 104.1 86.11 17.8 58.2 91.2 Yes
Lionel 112.5 85.6 26.9 20.7 38.6 Yes
Manville€  131.0 125.11 5.7 132.9 Yes/No
Penn-Dixie" 134.6 96.8 37.8 .6 7.5 Yes
Revere' 136.6 92.7 43.9 11.1 83.7 Yes
StorageTek f  145.6 130.5 15.1 117.2 No
Smith Int'l 151.1 107.1 44.0 159.7 Yes
Salant 157.0 96.5 60.5 2.2 37.5 Yes
Wilson Foods9 205.9 104.7 101.2 59.6 No
Continental 262.1 114.11 147.8 441.7 No
a Debtors were considered "solvent" if the total value distributed to unsecured
creditors and shareholders under the plan exceeded the amount of the allowed
unsecured claims. The "shortfall" to creditors is the total amount of allowed claims
of unsecured creditors less the value of the distribution to unsecured creditors. In
89 The availability of pendenq interest under the Bankruptcy Code is discussed
below. See infra text accompanying notes 96-102.
90 Consistent with this explanation, the creditor representatives in the Charter and
Lionel cases were aware they were receiving less than they would receive in an
adjudication. In AM International, creditors also probably realized they were receiving
less, but not as much less as our valuation indicates. Creditor representatives in AM
International believed that the stock distributed to creditors was worth more than it sold
for on our valuatiu" date; a few weeks after confirmation it did sell for significantly
more than on our valuation date.
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a chapter 11 case, the amounts of prepetition claims are generally considered fixed
as of the filing of the case. Under the absolute priority rule stated in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B), unsecured creditors are entitled to priority only for the nominal
amounts of their claims, not for the time value of those claims. Accordingly, in
calculating this table, the values distributed to creditors and shareholders were
discounted only to the date of confirmation of the plan, not to the date of the filing
of the petition. As a result, the calculations in this table ignore the time value of the
unsecured creditors' money during the pendency of the chapter 11 case. In Table
IV(B), the cents paid per dollar of unsecured creditors' claims have been recalculated,
discounting those values to the date of the filing of the petition in each case.
Recoveries in excess of 100 cents on the dollar in Table IV(B) can be thought of as
including "pendency" interest-that is, interest accruing during the pendency of the
chapter 11 case.
b In the Charter case, a major creditor contributed some extra capital and
received a controlling block of shares. We have excluded this creditor's claim and
distribution from our calculations concerning distributions to creditors because of
uncertainty about what part of the distribution should be attributed to the new capital
contributions and what part to the outstanding claims.
' Our figures in the Manville case are based solely on the distributions to
commercial and trade creditors; we excluded the asbestos health and property
damage claims because both the amounts of the claims and the value of their
distributions were highly speculative. There was an active equity committee in
Manville, but it was disbanded by court order before confirmation.
d In the Penn-Dixie Industries case, about half of the distributions made to
unsecured creditors were made to creditors of a wholly owned subsidiary (Penn-Dixie
Steel). These creditors received only about two-thirds of their claims. Because these
creditors had no clear legal entitlement to amounts distributed to equity holders in
the parent, we have not considered claims by and distributions to subsidiary creditors
in our calculations. We have also excluded from our calculations the claims of and
the sizable distributions made to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Because
the claim was disputed, we could not determine its amount.
e In the Revere case, the debtor disputed the amounts of the claims of the two
largest creditors. The settlement provided for a distribution to these creditors of
$35.7 million, but because we have no basis for determining the estimated amount
of the "allowed" claim, we have excluded this distribution from our calculations.
f In the Storage Technology case, a year delay occurred between basic approval
of the reorganization plan and its effective date, primarily because of the need to
resolve a contested IRS claim. During this period debt instruments and shares to be
distributed to unsecured creditors appreciated considerably, resulting in an
unintentional "overpayment" of creditors. The plan was not intended to pay creditors
post-petition interest.
9 In the Wilson Foods case, debenture holders received less than full payment
because they were subject to reinstatement and the interest rate was below the
prevailing rates. The other unsecured creditors received full payment. The
debenture issue was excluded from the calculations for this table.
In three of the cases in Table IV(A), Penn-Dixie, Revere, and
Salant, the belief of the lawyers who negotiated the plan was that
creditors were legally entitled to recover the full amounts of their
claims, without interest from the date of the filing of the petition to
the date the plan became effective (pendency interest), but with
interest at the "market rate" after the effective date. Each settle-
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ment was based upon that shared belief, and the plans are essential-
ly in accordance with the absolute priority rule.
Nevertheless, in each of the three cases, the actual value of the
creditors' recoveries, as of the day after confirmation of the plan,
was somewhat less than the full amounts of the claims. Several
factors were at work. First, debtors were able to "nibble" at
creditors' recoveries by fixing the "effective date" of the plan a short
period after the confirmation date. That enabled the debtors to
retain the creditors' cash a little longer, without paying or accruing
interest on it. 91 Second, the rates of post-confirmation interest
agreed to by the negotiators were below actual market rates.
9 2
The use of relatively low "market" rates of interest in the adjudica-
tion of bankruptcy cases is customary,93 and we think that the
negotiated rates simply reflect this custom. Third, when stock and
warrants were distributed to creditors, the parties may have guessed
that these securities would have a slightly higher value upon
distribution than the market actually assigned to them. Finally, in
Revere, creditors were offered a choice between payment in full
with a higher-than-market interest rate (14%) over a period of
eleven to fourteen years, or sixty to sixty-five cents on the dollar in
cash. Many of the trade creditors opted for the cash settlements,
thus reducing the average recovery of the entire creditor group.
94
91 We valued creditors' recoveries as of the day after confirmation of the plan.
Arguably, these valuations should have been as of the effective date of the plan. In a
few cases, however, the effective date did not occur until long after confirmation,
resulting in a diminution of creditors' recoveries that we thought should be reflected
in our findings.
92 We believe that the "protocol" rates of interest we used to discount creditors'
recoveries were low estimates of actual market rates. See supra note 28. We valued the
creditors' recoveries at less than their face value because the market rates adopted by
the negotiators were usually below even these protocol rates.
93 See L. LOPUCKi, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
11.6.2, at 412 (1985).
9' This rather clever scheme for avoiding the absolute priority rule reflected some
unusual bargaining leverages. In Revere, there was both an active equity committee and
a major shareholder who held three seats on the board of directors. The latter
circumstance was sufficient to insure management sympathy for a substantial
distribution to equity. Furthermore, the same shareholder also owned a majority of the
debenture issue. The option scheme enabled the company to pay the subordinated
debentures virtually in full, to pay many of the trade creditors only a fraction of their
claims, and to leave a substantial share for equity.
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B. "Overpayments" to Creditors and the Influence of Claims for
Pendency Interest
In four of the five cases in Table IV(A) in which creditors appear
to have been paid more than the full amount of their claims, the
creditors claimed they were entitled to "pendency interest," the
interest that would accrue on creditors' claims from the date of the
filing of the petition to the date of confirmation or the effective
date of the plan. An understanding of the creditors' claims to
pendency interest in these cases must begin with an examination of
creditors' legal entitlement to pendency interest.
95
The Bankruptcy Code permits confirmation by cram down of a
plan that provides unsecured creditors "property of a value, as of
the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of [their]
claim[s]." 96 Another section of the Code excludes pendency
interest from its definition of the "allowed amount" of a claim.
97
Since the cram down provisions provide the solution that would be
reached if a case were resolved by adjudication, at first glance it
would appear that there is no legal entitlement to pendency
interest.
The so-called "best interests of creditors" test is, however, a
prerequisite to confirmation of all plans, whether confirmed
consensually or by cram down. This test requires that each creditor
receive or retain under the plan "not less than the amount that [the
creditor] would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated
under chapter 7 of [the Bankruptcy Code] .... 98 If the liquida-
tion of a debtor under chapter 7 generates proceeds in excess of
what is needed to pay the allowed amount of all unsecured claims,
the excess is used to pay interest on those claims at the "legal
rate."99 Thus, creditors, who are not entitled to interest under the
95 For statutory analyses similar to this examination, see Blum, Treatment of Interest
on Debtor Obligations in Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy Code, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 430,
432 (1983); Fortgang & King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Some Wrong Policy Decisions,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1148, 1149-60 (1981); Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 35, at 1109-10;
Klee, supra note 13, at 234-37.
96 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) (1988). Under this section, the plan can also be
crammed down if unsecured creditors receive less than the amount of their claim and
junior interests receive nothing. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
17 See id. § 502(b)(2); see also United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 373 (1988) (holding that an undersecured creditor was not
entitled to postpetition interest on its claim and noting the "general rule disallowing
postpetition interest," with reference to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2)).
98 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1988).
9 See id. § 726(a)(5). The "legal rate" is a highly ambiguous standard. It is generally
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cram down provisions of :Bankruptcy Code section 1129(b)(2)(B),
will nevertheless be entitled to interest under the best interests of
creditors test if the company could be liquidated under chapter 7
for enough to pay such interest.
10 0
Most of the literature on corporate reorganization assumes that
the going concern values of companies usually exceed their
liquidation values.' 0 ' A growing number of theorists, however,
are questioning the conventional wisdom in this regard. These
revisionists postulate that financial markets operate with virtual
perfection and note that there is no a priori reason why a corpora-
tion cannot be liquidated under chapter 7 by selling it as a single
entity to the highest bidder. If markets operate perfectly and the
highest use of the company's assets is to continue the business, a
buyer should be willing to pay an amount equal to the discounted
future earnings of the business. In other words, the amount for
which a company can be liquidated would be the same as its value
would be assumed to be in a reorganization. 10 2 If the revisionist
understood to be a reference to the law of the forum state concerning the rate of
interest to be paid when a contract (for the payment of money with interest) does not
specify a rate. Legal rate may also be a reference to the rate payable on a money
judgment. In many states, the rate payable on a contract debt judgment is the rate
specified under the contract. As a result, the "legal rate" of interest payable under
chapter 7 may vary for every claim. SeegeneraUy 4 COLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 726.02[5]
(L. King 15th ed. 1990) (describing the historical background of laws relating to
postpetition interest). Some commentators have argued that the term "legal rate"
should be interpreted as the rate stated in the underlying credit agreement (if an
express rate is stated). See Fortgang & King, supra note 95, at 1151-53 (arguing that the
statutory interest rate should apply only to parties who have not bargained for a
different rate).
100 See In re SanJoaquin Estates, Inc., 64 Bankr. 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that
because similar creditors would receive interest in a chapter 7 case of this "very solvent"
debtor, denying the unsecured creditors' motion for postpetition interest in the chapter
11 case was an abuse of discretion); In re Boyer, 90 Bankr. 200, 201 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1988) (noting that unsecured creditors who would have received full payment in a
hypothetical chapter 7 case were entitled to pendency interest under the chapter 11
plan). There may be an exception to this requirement for postpetition interest where
a creditor receives cash for the allowed amount of the claims and thus is "unimpaired."
See Fortgang & King, supra note 95, at 1154-56. This circumstance did not occur in the
cases reported in Table IV(A).
101 See, e.g., Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 35, at 1064-65 ("Going concern values
generally exceed liquidation values .... Most asset 'liquidations' yield less than the
value of the asset if retained by iu; current owner." (footnote omitted)); Trost, supra
note 21, at 550 ("[T]he difference between the liquidation value and the going-concern
value... could be very substantial .... " (parentheses omitted)).
102 Professor Baird, for example, has noted:
The ability investment bankers have shown to take large firms public (such as
the Ford Motor Co. or Apple Computer) and the willingness of others to
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arguments were accepted, under the best interests of creditors test
the unsecured creditors of a company that proves solvent in chapter
11 reorganization would nearly always be entitled to pendency
interest. Such a result obtains because they could have recovered
interest if the company had been liquidated as a going concern
under chapter 7.
Our interviewees were far more skeptical than the revisionists
about the prospects for chapter 7 liquidations of the companies
included in this study. Their view of the efficacy of markets lay
somewhere between the dismal assumption that "[large distressed
corporations cannot be sold intact," cited by Professor Blum as one
of the two main principles of bankruptcy reorganization, 10 3 and
the revisionists' blithe assumptions of perfect markets.1 4  The
interviewees' view is also reflected in the "liquidation analyses"
contained in many of the disclosure statements in our cases. These
analyses, which contained the debtor's assertion as to what amounts
would be distributed to creditors if the company were liquidated
acquire firms for huge sums (such as General Motors' multibillion dollar
purchase of Hughes Aircraft) suggest that it is possible to sell the assets of
even giant corporations to third-party buyers. In a world in which informa-
tion can be gathered and communicated quickly and in which many
entrepreneurs specialize in acquiring firms in distress, the practical obstacles
(as opposed to the ones that are purely legal) seem quite surmountable.
Baird, supra note 1, at 141; see also Jackson & Scott, supra note 1, at 190 ("Going
concern value ... can be realized in a Chapter 7 liquidation by the simple expedient
of a sale of the business to a third-party buyer. Furthermore, a third-party sale should
generally be the optimal means of maximizing asset value.").
"0 The passage reads:
[T]wo main principles ... constitute the framework for our existing system
of reorganization.... The other [principle] is that the market value of a
distressed business or its assets is not to govern the rights of those financially
interested in the company. More particularly the creditors are not to fore-
close and force a... valuation of assets at prevailing market prices....
Abandonment or avoidance of the market in reorganizations has been
explained in a number of ways. The most general explanation is that
ordinarily no pertinent market exists. Large distressed corporations cannot
be sold intact, and selling them piecemeal changes the commodity by
destroying whatever value arises because a concern is a going thing and not
a collection of assets.
Blum, supra note 29, at 566 (footnotes omitted).
104 Under the current practice, a debtor whose business continues to operate
virtually always files under chapter 11. As a result, it is very difficult to ascertain
empirically whether companies could be sold intact in chapter 7 cases for the going
concern value. In practice, cases are converted to chapter 7 only when it is clear that
the business can no longer continue to operate profitably. Thereafter, the assets of the
business are usually sold piecemeal. See LoPucki, supra note 48, at 263-66.
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under chapter 7, were typically self-serving, since they were
designed to convince creditors that they would receive more under
the proposed plan than they would recover in a liquidation.
Nevertheless, in each case the court approved the analyses as part
of the disclosure statement, and in most cases105 there was no
suggestion that the creditors' representatives disagreed with them.
Listed below are the estimated payments to unsecured creditors
according to the liquidation analyses contained in the disclosure
statements of some of the "solvent" companies listed in Table IV(A):
Case Estimated Payments
AM International 70 to 76 cents on the dollar
Charter "Little or nothing"
Lionel 60 to 77 cents on the dollar
Manville 47 to 69 cents on the dollar
Revere 58 cents on the dollar
Salant 73.4 cents on the dollar
Given the perception that liquidation under chapter 7 would
have generated proceeds grossly insufficient to pay interest on
unsecured creditors' claims, it is perhaps not surprising that the
bargains in most of these cases were struck on the implicit assump-
tion that unsecured creditors were not entitled to pendency interest.
Wilson Foods was the first case in our study, chronologically, in
which the parties agreed to pay creditors postpetition interest.
Pendency interest was set at 9.5%, which was only slightly below the
market rate. 10 6 It was not until the fifth year of our study that
there were other cases in which there was a consensus that the
company probably could have been liquidated in chapter 7 for more
than enough to pay interest on creditors' claims. The rate of
pendency interest paid in the Continental Airlines and Smith
International cases was less than prevailing contract or market rates,
however, and reflected a negotiated compromise of the creditors'
claims to pendency interest. In both cases the compromise was at
105 The Manville case was an exception. In the early stages, the asbestos health
claimants argued that the proceeds of a liquidation would be sufficient to pay them in
fmli. 106 In Wilson Foods, the debtor arguably had the right to leave a group of debenture
holders unimpaired and pay the holders only the contract rate of interest. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1124(1), (2)(D) (1988). Aggressive bondholders declared the bond issue in default and
threatened to litigate their issues. The resulting compromise shortened the maturity
date for the debentures, which enhanced their market value, but it still left the creditors
with debentures worth substantially less than their face values. These bondholders also
received pendency interest, though at a lesser rate.
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least partly attributable to the aggressive representation of equity at
the bargaining table. 10 7 Continental was a subsidiary of Texas
Air, which owned 78% of its shares, controlled Continental's
management, and aggressively represented the interests of share-
holders. In Smith International, shareholders were represented by
an effective, active equity committee. The committee was formed
and dominated by professional investors who acquired substantial
positions in Smith stock about the time of filing.10 8  In both
Continental Airlines and Smith International, the representatives of
equity accepted the payment of some pendency interest, but their
presence at the bargaining table, whether through an equity
committee or through a management committed to their interests,
appears to have been an important factor in forcing a compromise
on the rates.
In the Manville case, equity holders challenged a plan that
provided for the payment of pendency interest to unsecured bank
and trade creditors.1 0 9 The plan had been negotiated at a time
when the parties thought the company was solvent, but assessments
had changed by the time of confirmation. The court found that
Manville was insolvent. Nonetheless, the court confirmed the plan
which provided for the payment of pendency interest.110 The
payment of pendency interest in the case of an insolvent debtor will
presumably be a rare event, and it reflects the unusual presence in
that case of a large class of "future" claims-that is, claims for
injuries that had not yet manifested themselves, though they would
inevitably occur based on past events.
111
10 7 As an additional reason for the compromise, one of our interviewees cited the
fact that until then there had been few cases allowing pendency interest.
108 The equity committee was chaired byJeffrey Chanin, a distinguished bankruptcy
attorney who had also served as financial vice-president of Wickes Companies during
its chapter 11 proceedings. Chanin certainly had the knowledge and ability to bargain
effectively on behalf of the equity committee.
109 Under the plan, the creditors to whom pendency interest was paid were
commercial lenders and trade creditors, not the asbestos health claimants, most of
whose claims were unliquidated.
110 The rates paid were considerably below the market. See In re Johns-Manville
Corp., 68 Bankr. 618, 637-38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd', 78 Bankr. 407 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), ard, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
11 These are, of course, asbestos claims. As explained in footnote c to Table IV(A),
our valuations did not include either the claims of, or the distributions to, classes of
unliquidated claims. On this basis, we concluded that Manville kvas solvent. If this
conclusion and the bankruptcy court's finding that Manville was insolvent at the time
of confirmation are both correct, necessarily it is the asbestos claims that were
underpaid. Significantly in this regard, there have been post-confirmation reports that
174 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:125
The Manville court offered two justifications for confirming a
plan under which pendency interest was paid by an insolvent
debtor. First, the only o1jectors to confirmation of the plan were
common shareholders. The court concluded that they lacked
standing to object to the provisions allowing pendency interest to
unsecured creditors. In essence, the court reasoned that if
pendency interest were denied to unsecured creditors, preferred
shareholders rather than common shareholders would have had the
right to the funds thus made available. 112 Yet, those preferred
shareholders had accepted the plan by the requisite majorities.
113
The second justification was quite unorthodox. The court stated
that because the agreement to pay postpetition interest "repre-
sent[ed] a settlement of the claims of unsecured creditors reached
among the parties,"114 it -was not a "contested matter" and, there-
fore, the Bankruptcy Code provision disallowing pendency interest
for disputed claims did riot apply.115 The common shareholders
voted against the plan, though, which was confirmed after a cram
down hearing. Only if the common shareholders were ignored was
it possible for the court to conclude that the payment of pendency
interest was "uncontested." Thus, the decision ultimately rests on
the court's determination that the common shareholders lacked
standing to dispute the issue of pendency interest."1
6
Claims to pendency interest were not the only cause of "over-
payments" to unsecured creditors. In Storage Technology, the
overpayment was entirely unintended. At the time the debtor and
creditor representatives agreed on the terms of the reorganization
plan, they thought that the distribution to unsecured creditors
would be slightly less than the full face amount of their claims. The
the Manville trust has insufficient funds to pay the claims of asbestos victims. See
Labaton, Asbestos Trust Fund of Manville Queried, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1990, at D1, col.
4; Labaton, Manville Trst Fund in Troubl4 N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1989, at D1, col. 6.
112 See In reJohns-Manville Corp., 68 Bankr. at 637-38. In this respect the court's
rationale is unexceptional and represents the standard law that a party does not have
standing to raise issues that could not benefit its distribution even if successful. See
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
11s See In reJohns-Manville Corp., 68 Bankr. at 621.
114 Id. at 637.
11 It is generally accepted that a plan approved by all classes can pay pendency
interest. See Blum, supra note 95, at 434.
116 Perhaps the Manville decision is best understood in light of parties' failure to
reach agreement on a plan for more than four years after filing. Presented with a
choice between approving the payment of pendency interest and sending the parties
back to renegotiate the plan, the court may simply have chosen confirmation as the
lesser of two evils.
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need to satisfy conditions of the plan prior to confirmation delayed
confirmation until nine months after the bargain was struck. In the
interim, the fortunes of the company had dramatically improved, as
had the value of the reorganization securities to be delivered to
both creditors and shareholders. Although we found no direct
evidence that the increase in the value of the reorganization
securities was anticipated at the time the reorganization plan was
negotiated, it may nonetheless be significant that shareholders were
virtually unrepresented in reorganization plan negotiations.
17
Unsecured creditors are generally considered not to be entitled
to pendency interest, and the figures in Table IV(A) therefore
provide a reasonably good measure of how well the recoveries in
these cases reflected the legal entitlements of the unsecured
creditors under the absolute priority rule. We constructed Table
IV(B) in order to compare the values of these recoveries with the
amounts unsecured creditors would have received had they been
paid both their allowed claims and pendency interest at full market
rates.
In this table, the recoveries of the unsecured creditors have been
discounted to their present values as of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.118 The figures in column 5 show that with the single
exception of the "accident" in Storage Technology, the present
values of creditors' recoveries as of the filing of the petition were
less than the amounts of their claims on the same date. Accounting
for the time value of money, therefore, creditors suffered a loss in
nearly every case, even when the recoveries of shareholders were
substantial. It becomes apparent that in the cases of solvent or
nearly solvent companies of the type included in this study, the
losses are shared, even in the "overpayment" cases.
117 Even though the company was solvent, the U.S. Trustee was unable to organize
an equity committee. The Trustee declined to appoint two attorneys representing
shareholders who had initiated class actions against the debtor based on pre-filing
securities law violations, and he could find no other shareholders willing to serve. The
CEO, installed during the proceedings and owing his job as much to creditors as to
shareholders, adopted a neutral stance in plan negotiations.
118 That is, had creditors received both the full amount of their allowed claims and
pendency interest at our discount rate, the numbers in column 5 would all be 100.
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TABLE IV(B)
SOLVENTa DEBTORS: CREDITORS' RECOVERIES ADJUSTED FOR THE
Loss OF TIME VALUE OF THEIR MONEY DURING PENDENCY OF THE
CHAPTER 11 CASE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cents per Cents per
Dollar to Dollar to
Unsecured Unsecured
Creditors Years from Creditors
(as of Discount Rate Petition to (as of
Case Name Confirmation)C Employedd Confirmation filing)'
Lionel 85.6 10.1% 3.6 60.5
AM International 86.1 12.5% 2.4 64.9
Charter 86.3 7.4% 2.7 71.1
Revere 92.7 9.4% 2.8 72.0
Penn-Dixie 96.8 15.3% 1.9 73.9
Salant 96.5 7.9% 2.2 81.7
Manville 125.3 8.5% 4.3 88.4
Continental 114.3 8.2% 2.8 91.7
Smith International 107.1 8.1% 1.7 93.8
Wilson Foods 104.7 10.1% .9 96.0
Storage Tech 130.5 8.0% 2.6 106.9
a Debtors were considered "solvent" if the total value distributed to unsecured
creditors and shareholders under the plan exceeded the amount of the allowed
unsecured claims.
b In a chapter 11 case, the amounts of claims are fixed as of the filing of the case.
Under the absolute priority rule stated in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B), unsecured
creditors are entitled to priority only for the nominal amounts of their claims, not for
the time value of those claims. The degree of adherence to the absolute priority rule
is shown in Table IV(A).
' The amounts stated this column are from column (3) of Table IV(A). They are
the values of the distributions to the holders of allowed unsecured claims (valued as
of the date of the confirmation) divided by the amounts of those claims (as of the
date of the filing of the petition).
d Discount rates are derived from the researchers' table of benchmark rates. The
rate employed is the benchmark rate of interest on the date of confirmation for the
period of the chapter 11 case. The rates stated on this table have been rounded.
This column shows the cents per dollar recovered by holders of unsecured
claims reduced to present value as of the date of the filing of the petition, the date
as of which the amounts of those claims were determined. Thus, the figures in
column (5) take account of the time value of the unsecured creditors' money during
the pendency of the chapter 11 case.
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The following bar graph shows the degree to which the results
in the cases studied adhered to the absolute priority rule. The cases
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paid. The area of the black bar indicates the dollar value of the
distribution to creditors in the case; the area of the white bar
indicates the value of the distribution to equity. In the first five
cases at the left, the heights of the black bars show that creditors
were paid more than the full amounts of their claims, generally as
pendency interest. In the remaining cases of solvent debtors,
n 9
the deviations from the absolute priority rule in favor of equity
classes are often substantial. But among the cases of insolvent
debtors, the distributions to equity are only small percentages of the
amounts paid to unsecured creditors.
120
Had the absolute priority rule been strictly enforced in the cases
of insolvent debtors, recoveries by shareholders in twenty-one cases
totaling $154 million would have been eliminated. In the cases of
solvent debtors shown on Table IV(A), unsecured creditors would
have recovered at least 100 cents on the dollar of their claims.
12 1
Further, if one believes that creditors should receive pendency
interest so that they are "made whole" for the loss of the time value
of money, there was only a single case in which this result was
achieved.
Expressed as a percentage of the entire distribution in these
cases, the deviations from the absolute priority rule are small and
rarely exceed 10%. In absolute terms, however, they are substantial,
virtually all measuring in the millions of dollars. In a few cases the
size of the deviation exceeded $50 million.1 22 Although we did
not measure the deviations in favor of subdebt, 123 those devia-
tions were probably greater than the deviations in favor of equity.
There has been much discussion about the high cost of
professional fees in bankruptcy cases, and some lament that these
fees are draining assets that could be used either to pay creditors or
119 Penn-Dixie through Lionel on the graph.
120 Compare the area of the white bar to the area of the black bar for the same
case. Note that the proportion of the distribution paid to equity in Dreco Energy was
substantial, for reasons discussed supra note 51.
121 In the Lionel, AM International, and Charter cases, the shortfall to unsecured
creditors was so large that it simply could not have been an artifact of our valuation
protocols.
122 For example, according to our estimates, equity received $63 million in Wickes,
and in Charter, a solvent company at confirmation, creditors received $58 million less
than their allowed claims.
123 We did not do so because there was often legal ambiguity about the rights of
subordinated debt. See supra note 76. Consequently, for many cases it was impossible
to construct an objective measure of the variation between subdebt's entitlements and
its actual distribution.
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to provide capital to the reorganized business.1 24 Although we
have not been able to systematically collect information about the
size of these professional fees, 125 they were probably smaller than
the deviations from the absolute priority rule observed in many of
these cases.
Absolute priority is the rule of law for adjudicating cases in
chapter 11. In enacting the current Bankruptcy Code, however,
Congress expected that most chapter 11 cases would be resolved by
agreement and that those agreements would include deviations from
the absolute priority rule.1 26 While it may seem peculiar to have
a system which establishes one rule as the norm for adjudicated
cases, knowing that different norms will be applied in the settled
cases, which constitute the vast majority of outcomes, this is
certainly not an unusual feature of the American legal land-
scape.
127
A. Should the Absolute Priority Rule Be Enforced?
There is intuitive appeal to the position that the bankruptcy
system should be redesigned to ensure that creditors receive
absolute priority. This position is sometimes defended by reference
to a presumed "creditors' bargain." According to this view, the goal
of bankruptcy policy should be to achieve results that creditors had
reason to expect, and hence implicitly bargained for, when they
originally extended credit. Proponents of this view normally assume
that the results creditors can expect in the absence of a bankruptcy
filing are the terms of the creditors' bargain. 28 They argue that
124 See e.g., S. STEIN, A FEAST FOR LAWYERS 126-30 (1989) (citing examples in which
lawyers allegedly overbilled the debtors).
125 Such information is not routinely included in disclosure statements. Fees which
are charged against the estate are subject to court approval, and it therefore would be
possible to collect information about these charges from court records. We were unable
to undertake this effort, however, because our cases were filed all around the country.
126 See supra text accompanying note 22.
127 For example, legislators who conclude that the perpetrator of a particular crime
should be sentenced to five years may nonetheless set the penalty at eight years based
on empirical data showing that with the penalty at eight, the plea bargains will be at
five. Once this system is in operation, however, it becomes unclear what the proper
sentence ought to be for the perpetrator convicted without a plea bargain. If the crime
is worth only five, it would seem that the temerity of putting the state to its proof must
be worth three. Fortunately for criminal judges, this dilemma is not presented in such
a stark form. There is virtually always a range of sentences that may be handed down,
and a ready supply of background information about the defendant that can be used
to distinguish the particular case and limit any deleterious precedential effects.
128 This view is most closely associated with Dean Jackson. See T. JACKSON, THE
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these results, which they call "prebankruptcy entitlements," should
only be impaired in bankruptcy when it will permit greater overall
distributions to creditors as a group; impairment should never be
permitted to accomplish purely distributional goals, such as altering
who gets what proportion of the debtor's assets.
129
If the "creditors' bargains" to which this argument refers are
actual bargains premised on enforcement of the absolute priority
rule,13 0 the argument rests on a faulty premise. Real creditors
live, lend, and strike their bargains in a world where they have every
reason to believe that defaulting debtors will file bankruptcy
petitions, and that in those bankruptcies, the absolute priority rule
will not be strictly enforced. Creditors set their terms of credit,
including interest rates, accordingly. To begin enforcing the
absolute priority rule in the guise of "prebankruptcy entitlement"
would, in the short term at least, give creditors a windfall.
There remains the question whether other considerations of
policy favor strict enforcement of absolute priority. A number of
scholars share Professor Baird's view that "a single set of rules
should distribute losses that flow from a business failure .... Legal
rights should turn as little as possible on the forum in which one
person or another seeks to vindicate them."' 3 l The purpose
underlying this objective is to avoid creating incentives for forum
shopping, particularly incentives to choose a bankruptcy rather than
a non-bankruptcy forum for the resolution of debt problems.
3 2
Absolute priority is the formal rule for distribution between
creditor and shareholder of a large company in the absence of
bankruptcy. In theory, at least, a creditor who is not paid can
LoGic AND LIMrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAw (1986); Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements, and the Creditors'Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 868-71 (1982) (maintaining that
'creditors' bargain" explains normative underpinnings of the bankruptcy process from
which practice and the Code itself seem to deviate).
129 SeeJackson & Scott, supra note 1, at 155-56.
130 The hypothetical creditors' bargain might be understood simply as use of an
"economic model," and hence not appropriately contradicted empirically. The
statements nevertheless give the impression that they are about actual bargains reached
by real creditors. See, e.g., Baird &Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of
the Absolute Priority Rule 55 U. GHi. L. REv. 738, 742 (1988) ("In 'these cases the
appropriate course also is to allow the most senior creditor.., to sell the assets of the
firm .... The junior creditors and the shareholders cannot complain because they
have bargained for a position inferior to that of the senior creditor with respect to all
the assets being sold.").
131 Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U.
CH. L. REv. 815, 822 (1987).
132 See id. at 826-28.
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obtain a judgment, levy on property of the debtor, and force its
sale. The rule for distribution of the proceeds is that nothing may
be paid to the debtor until after creditors are paid in full. 133
Similarly, if a corporation is dissolved under state law, the assets are
first applied to satisfy debts and only the remaining assets are
distributed to shareholders.1 34  Distributing dividends to the
shareholders of an insolvent corporation is generally illegal. 135
Even though absolute priority is the doctrinal rule outside
bankruptcy, it is not an accurate description of the actual pattern of
distributions in such cases. Bargaining takes place outside bank-
ruptcy as well, so it is far from clear that any difference exists in the
patterns of distribution produced by the bankruptcy and non-
bankruptcy systems. Under both systems, absolute priority governs
adjudication. Yet under both, the parties are free to, and almost
always do, enter into settlement agreements that deviate from the
absolute priority rule.
1 36
Even if non-bankruptcy practices respected the absolute priority
rule, it would not follow that the bankruptcy practice should be
changed. Professor Baird points out that when state rules of
distribution clash with bankruptcy rules on a particular point, the
conflict itself does not indicate which should yield to the other.
13 7
133 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 5234(a) (McKinney 1978) (providing that the
proceeds of personal property sold under execution should be distributed "to the
judgment creditor and any excess shall be paid over to the judgment debtor").
s See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1005(3)(A) (McKinney 1986) (providing that
"[a]fter paying or adequately providing for the payment of its liabilities: [t]he
corporation ... may sell its remaining assets ... and distribute the same among the
shareholders according to their respective rights").
135 See, e.g., WIs. STAT. § 180.38(1) (1957 & Supp. 1989) (providing that "[t]he board
of directors of a corporation may, from time to time, declare and the corporation may
pay dividends ... except when the corporation is insolvent...").
136 For an interesting account of the corporate reorganization of a large, publicly
held corporation outside bankruptcy, see B. MARSH, A CORPORATE TRAGEDY: THE
AGONY OF INTERNATIONAL HARVEsTER COMPANY 258-75 (1985). The reorganization
consisted of a considerable debt for equity swap, but equity retained its shares.
Because normal corporate governance mechanisms are sometimes suspended in
bankruptcy, seesupln note 63, there is more reason to believe that corporate governance
mechanisms operate to maintain management loyalty to shareholder interests outside,
rather than inside, bankruptcy. We suggested earlier that management loyalty to
shareholders is one reason cited for distributions to equity in bankruptcy. See supra text
accompanying note 57. In the International Harvester negotiations, management
consistently held out for the interests of equity in negotiations with creditor interests.
See B. MARSH, supra, at 287-94.137 See Baird, supra note 131, at 823. Professor Baird states:
The only point Jackson and I make is that the priorities that exist under
nonbankruptcy law should run parallel to priorities in bankruptcy. To the
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If we approach the problem of reconciliation conservatively, seeking
to determine which set of rules can be changed with the least
disruption of existing practices, we must conclude that, at least in
the case of large, publicly held companies, the state rule of absolute
priority can be changed more easily than the bankruptcy rule of
modified absolute priority. Such companies are rarely liquidated
under state law procedures; when they fail they almost invariably
wind up in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy rule is the only rule that
actually distributes losses between creditors and shareholders in any
sizable number of cases.
A second argument that might support strict adherence to the
absolute priority rule rests. on efficiency considerations. Scholars
attempting to determine the most efficient legal rule often try to
adopt a Rawlsian original position and to imagine what kinds of
lending contracts creditors and firms would reach if they were to
bargain on a clean slate.' 38 From this perspective, a system of
absolute priority may seem more efficient because substituting a
"sum certain" for the uncertain amounts distributable under other
systems reduces the strategic costs of competing for the debtors'
assets and reduces variance in recoveries; this reduction is "a virtue
to risk-averse creditors."
139
A priori arguments about efficiency based on hypothetical
creditor bargains can usually be made for several possible resolu-
tions of a particular issue. Thus, ProfessorJackson, once associated
with the view that enforcement of absolute priority would enhance
efficiency, recently speculated, along with Professor Scott, that a
scheme that leaves some value to junior interests might be more
efficient in dealing with "common" risks and "eve of bankruptcy"
risks.140 Although Jackson's recent position can make one more
comfortable with the results we have observed, it fails to account for
why this pattern of results has developed. 4 1  More to the point,
extent that these priorities generate bad distributional consequences, they
should be changed in both settings.
To say that bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy priorities should be the same
does not say anything about what those priorities should be.
Id.
138 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note .28, at 860 ("A more profitable line of pursuit might
be to view bankruptcy as a system designed to mirror the agreement one would expect
the creditors to form among themselves were they able to negotiate such an agreement
from an ex ante position.").
139 Id. at 861-62. This rationale would support almost any rule that provides
predictability of results.
140 SeeJackson & Scott, supra note 1, at 164-74, 190-94.
141 See Roe, Commtentary on "On the Nature of Banknuptcy': Bankruptcy, Priority, and
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a priori reasoning, though' producing useful insights, cannot
establish factually what the most efficient rule governing distribu-
tions in bankruptcy would be.
The absolute priority rule may also be evaluated on the basis of
fairness. From this perspective, one argument against strict enforce-
ment of the rule is that it would eliminate sharing by "public"
shareholders and "public" bondholders to the benefit of trade
creditors and institutional lenders. If the former are presumed less
powerful than the latter, 142 the results observed may seem more
equitable than strict application of the rule.
Publicly held securities and even creditors' claims are freely
traded, however. By the time plan benefits are actually conferred
at confirmation, the original "public" investors or creditors may
have sold their securities or claims to professional investors. Market
theorists may postulate that the public holders will nevertheless
capture the benefit of distribution to junior claimants when they sell
their securities and claims, because the market will anticipate the
plan's distributional scheme and price these assets accordingly. In
reality, in the forty-three cases we studied, public securities holders
and even trade creditors often sold their claims and interests
cheaply to more sophisticated professional investors who proceeded
to realize a considerable profit.143 It is possible, of course, that
the price paid by these investors was greater than it would have
Economics, 75 VA. L. REV. 219, 234-38 (1989) (describing a similar reaction to the
practice of reasoning from a hypothetical creditors' bargain).
142 Professors Blum and Kaplan contend:
Chapter X was drawn against a factual backdrop of senior debt held largely
by public investors, in opposition to equity investment often drawn from other
than widespread public sources. At present the prevailing pattern may be
different; holders of senior debt may largely be institutional investors and
public investment may be mainly in the form of subordinated debentures or
preferred or common stock.
Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 651, 661 (1974). The cases in our study corroborate this trend as the senior debt
was typically held by banks, insurance companies, and, to a lesser degree, trade credi-
tors. The subordinate debt and equity typically were publicly held.
14s An extreme example was Revere Copper and Brass. In that case, professional
investors purchased claims from trade creditors only months prior to confirmation for
as little as 25 cents on the dollar. Under the plan, they could elect to receive a cash
payment of 60 cents on the dollar. Even the cash payment only appealed to relatively
unsophisticated investors or those interested in a quick profit. The more sophisticated
institutional investors elected to receive promissory notes for 100 cents on the dollar
with interest at 14% per year.
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been if the absolute priority rule were strictly enforced, but this
possibility is far from certain.
The most credible argument for strict enforcement of the
absolute priority rule stems from concern that deviations from the
rule are the product of "holdup" activity in which junior claimants
abuse the adjudicative process and delay the proceedings in order
to capture the "nuisance" value of positions that lack legal legitima-
cy.144  Equity holders actually engaged in obstructionist tactics
designed to extract a nuisance value settlement in only a few cases
in our study. Still, there always was the implied threat that
excluding equity holders might catalyze them to organize and
engage in such activity. For example, at the time the plan was
drafted in the McLouth Steel case, the company's only assets were
its net operating loss carryovers, or NOLs. It was mathematically
impossible to value the NOLs high enough to render the company
solvent; in fact, creditors were compromising the amounts of their
claims and then receiving an average of only eighteen cents on each
dollar of the compromised claims. Despite the fact that equity
holders had no committee, did not organize, and made no demands,
the negotiators included them in the distribution, largely because of
the concern that if confronted with a proposed plan that provided
them with nothing, equity might organize and "kick sand in our
faces."
Bankruptcy procedures foster such concerns. A plan of
reorganization is essentially a settlement agreement among
thousands of parties. Decisions about who will share and in what
proportion must be made approximately three to five months before
the plan comes before the court for confirmation. In the interim,
the plan and the disclosure statement must be reduced to writing,
and both must be approved by the negotiators; the disclosure
statement must be approved by the court on twenty-five days notice;
thousands of creditors and shareholders must be given ample time
to vote; and the parties must prepare for the confirmation hearing.
If the plan is to be modified, the holders adversely affected by the
modification must be afforded twenty days notice and an opportuni-
144 See Blum & Kaplan, supra note 142, at 664 ("A chief concern behind the
adoption of the absolute priority doctrine was to preventjunior investors from gaining
participation in a reorganized entity by trading on the nuisance value of otherwise
worthless claims."); see also In re Heck's, Inc., 112 Bankr. 775, 803-04 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va.
1990) (finding equity committee's obstructions improper).
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ty to change their votes.145  Thus, if a proposed plan excludes
equity from distributions, the equity class will still have ample time
to organize and mount an obstructionist campaign. This extended
window of vulnerability means that equity neither has to engage in
obstructionist tactics nor even make threats in order to generate
leverage. Proponents of a plan must respond not just to equity's
actions, but also to equity's potential actions.
If an official committee is appointed to represent the interests
of equity holders, the expenses of that committee, including
attorneys' fees, ordinarily are paid by the debtor. 146 In the case
of an insolvent company, the effect is usually to impose the cost of
equity's campaign on creditors. There is a risk that the bankruptcy
court will refuse to award fees for a campaign it considers obstruc-
tionist,147 but the committee's attorneys are often willing to
assume this risk in order to obtain the case. Equity itself has no
reason not to fight.
Not all deviations from the absolute priority rule stem from
sound judgments about the potential strength of equity's leverage.
We argued earlier 148 that there is a shared belief among the
lawyers who regularly appear in these cases that consensual plans
are the only practical method of resolving large chapter 11 cases.
This belief is reinforced by the myth that cram down is expensive
and time consuming. In cases in which creditors recover only a
small proportion of their claims, we believe cram down can be
achieved more easily than anticipated; our judgment is that an
aggressive equity committee cannot impose extensive costs on
creditors pursuing cram down in such cases unless it has support
from the bankruptcy judge.149  If this judgment is correct, it is
145 See 11 U.S.C. § 2002(a)(6) (1988).
146 See id. § 330. Court approval for the hiring of professionals is required. See id.
§ 1103(a). In the large cases we studied, retention of counsel was always approved.
Retention of accountants and investment bankers was sometimes approved as well.
147 In a recent case not in our sample, a bankruptcy judge reduced compensation
to an equity committee after determining that it had taken actions for strictly dilatory
reasons. See In re Heck's, Inc., 112 Bankr. at 803-04. In an extreme case, an
overzealous committee may be disbanded, as occurred in the Manville case. While we
could get no direct confirmation from the attorneys we interviewed, it seems reasonable
to suppose that such continuing court supervision had the effect of moderating the
demands of equity committees in some instances. Direct confirmation of this hypothesis
by the equity committee lawyers we interviewed would essentially have been an
admission of less than zealous pursuit of the clients' interests for the purpose of
protecting fees.
148 See supra text following note 62.
149 See supra text accompanying notes 34-47.
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possible that in the future the deviations from the absolute priority
rule will become less frequent in large cases, as creditor groups
realize the feasibility of cram down. The shared belief in the
impracticality of cram down may not be immutable, after all.
The shared belief may not change easily, however, and devia-
tions from the absolute priority rule do result, to some extent, from
sound judgments about equity's obstructionist potential. We
therefore recommend a procedural innovation in bankruptcy
practice. Deviations from the absolute priority rule resulting from
equity's obstructionist potential could be reduced or eliminated if
it were possible to obtain a determination early in a chapter 11 case
that equity had no plausible entitlement to share in the distribution
and therefore was not a party in interest.
150
Although it has always been assumed that the valuation that is
the basis for cram down can only be made at the confirmation
hearing, the Code does not mandate such a procedure. Bankruptcy
courts could exercise their power to "issue any order . .. that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title"15 1 to determine, even before a plan has been proposed,
whether specified claims or interests would be entitled to any
property in a cram down.
Under our proposal, if such an order was entered against share-
holders, one effect would be to release management from any
150 Professor Blum developed the theoretical basis for such a determination in the
context of chapter X:
The determination of which classes of creditors and shareholders shall
have a voice in formulating the program of rehabilitation is treated under
reorganization doctrine as a function of reorganization value. All classes
whose claims, taken in the order of their priority and at their nominal
amounts, fit within the reorganization value are considered as having a stake
in the business. Accordingly these groups are allowed to participate through
appropriate representation in drawing up the program and to vote upon it.
The classes that are wholly eliminated by reorganization value are given more
limited rights. To protect their interests they must be able to take part in
hearings concerned with fixing that value, and have the right of appeal to
correct irregularities or errors in the valuation process. Once reorganization
value has been properly established the groups eliminated by it should have
no further standing in the rehabilitation proceedings. Two exceptions might
be in order. Eliminated dasses perhaps should be allowed to demonstrate
either that a change in conditions prior to completion of the proceedings
makes it reasonable to increase reorganization value enough to accommodate
them or that the business should be sold instead of reorganized because an
advance in market prices enables them to share in the sale proceeds.
Blum, supra note 29, at 589.
15, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
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further obligation to represent them in future plan negotia-
tions. 152 Similarly, if an order were entered against subordinated
debentures, one effect would be to release the unsecured creditors'
committee from representing them. In either situation, any
committee previously appointed exclusively to represent the holders
should be disbanded. The practical effect and purpose would be to
eliminate the nuisance value of the affected claims or interests, and
to permit those with a stake in the business to negotiate a solution
to their problems in simpler circumstances, thereby reducing
administration costs.
1 53
Of course, shareholders or creditors against whom such a
preemptive cram down order was entered would not be prohibited
from sharing under the plan. There are circumstances in which
senior creditor interests might decide that it is in their own self
interest to make a distribution to such junior claimants, and no rule
would foreclose confirmation of such a plan.'54 For example, in
a case in which there are only a few senior creditors, inclusion of a
distribution to shareholders can help create a market in reorganiza-
tion securities, by ensuring that such securities are widely held. 55
Under the tax law provisions, distribution of reorganization
securities to junior creditors often preserves net operating loss
carryovers, thereby positively contributing to overall firm value.'
56
Managers whose knowledge or skills are essential to continuation of
the business could also be permitted to share under a plan, perhaps
even receiving all shares in the emerging company. They would,
however, share expressly on that basis and not "on account of" their
shareholdings.
157
152 Management's legal obligation to represent shareholders in plan negotiations and
the extent to which they actually do so will be discussed in a subsequent article.
153 After a preemptive cram down order is entered, it seems likely that consensus
on a plan will be reached more quickly and easily, due to the smaller number of parties
who need to be consulted.
154 In this respect, the rule we propose differs from the old chapter X requirements,
which mandated distribution in accordance with the absolute priority rule.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
156 supra note 62.
157 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) (1988). This distinction has been recognized in
the case law. See, e.g., In re Potter Material Serv., 781 F.2d 99, 102 (7th Cir. 1986)
(permitting sole shareholder to retain interest in debtor corporation because of his
investment of new capital); In re Landau Boat Co., 13 Bankr. 788, 792 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1981) (permitting investors to make substantial contributions to a reorganized
corporation, although their old equity interest maybe extinguished). It remains unclear
whether these authorities still justify confirmation of such a plan in a cram down
proceeding, because of the Supreme Court's decision in Norwest Bank Worthington v.
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Based on our observations of the use of cram down, 1 58 we
believe that even if the right to such preemptive cram down orders
was clearly established, it would not result in a significant number
of contested valuation hearings. If the shareholders' right to share
in the distribution was in doubt, seeking such an order would not
be cost effective for creditors. The hearing would be relatively
complex and expensive, the court would be reluctant to foreclose
claims or interests because of the possibility that circumstances
would later change, and any order that was entered would be
vulnerable on appeal or reconsideration. In close cases, and
particularly when creditors are adverse to delay, as they usually are,
it would continue to make sense to include everyone as part of a
consensual plan. Like cram downs, preemptive cram downs seldom
would be tried against c]laims or interests not clearly underwa-
ter. 159
Preemptive cram down orders would eliminate sharing by equity
and subordinated debt holders in some cases. We do not think this
elimination would conflict with the congressional intent of the 1978
modification of the absolute priority rule. Congress expected
negotiated plans of reorganization to deviate from the absolute
priority rule, but the legislative history is consistent with the view
that Congress retained the absolute priority rule as the ideal,
accepting bargaining by the parties only to eliminate the necessity
for the court to value the company in every case.
160
Our proposal is less radical than others that have been made for
insuring compliance with the absolute priority rule. Professor Roe
has recommended amending chapter 11 to require that only cash
and reorganization shares be distributed under a plan. 16 1  To
facilitate such a scheme, and to avoid the need for the bankruptcy
Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202-11 (1988) (rejecting a reorganization plan as contrary to the
absolute priority rule because the recipients of shares had contributed only "sweat
equity"). See Klee, supra note 13, at 239-44 (noting that after Ahers was reported,
"courts began equivocating on survival of the new value exception" that permitted new
contributions by owners). Little doubt exists, though, that such a plan can be confirmed
if agreed to by all classes.158 In the cases studied, cram down was employed principally to establish obvious
facts in the absence of opposition. Of the 21 cram downs in these cases, only three
resulted in a contested hearing. See supra Table II following note 31.
159 The bankruptcy courts could, and probably should, use their discretion over fee
awards to ensure that preemptive cram downs are not sought in inappropriate
situations.
160 See supra text accompanying note 22.
161 See Roe, supra note 1, at 597-62.
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court to place a value on the shares to be distributed under the
plan, he proposed that 10% of the shares in the reorganized
company be marketed before confirmation. The purpose would be
to establish objectively a value for the reorganization shares, a value
that could then be used to divide the remaining shares between
creditors and shareholders strictly in accordance with the absolute
priority rule.
162
Professor Bebchuk has offered a proposal with a similar thrust,
though differing in important details.1 63 In effect, he would give
all reorganization securities to the senior creditor class, while
extending to junior classes the right to redeem the shares from the
senior class by paying the senior class's claims in full.1 64 Profes-
sor Baird has suggested that all companies in chapter 11 be sold as
a unit for cash to the highest bidder, 165 with the proceeds pre-
sumably distributed strictly in accordance with the absolute priority
rule.
One objective of each of these proposals is to ensure strict
application of the absolute priority rule. Each proposal reflects a
strong belief in the ability of the market to value correctly the worth
of a corporation undergoing reorganization. Professor Baird's faith
is placed in the market for buying whole companies, even very large
ones. Professors Roe and Bebchuk place their faith in the markets
for reorganization securities. We do not share their faith. Any
valuation of a corporation undergoing reorganization, whether by
the market or by judicial process as under the old chapter X, is only
approximate.166 That being the case, fairness considerations do
not compel strict compliance with the absolute priority rule,
particularly since, as our data shows, the extent of deviations from
the absolute priority rule is modest in most large cases. Further-
more, as we have argued above, there are reasons to believe that
distributions strictly in accordance with the absolute priority rule
162 See id. at 559.
163 See Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 781-97.
164 If there are several junior classes, the most senior of thejunior class would have
the redemption right initially, and more junior classes, such as equity, could redeem
from ajunior class that is more senior and had earlier exercised a redemption right.
In effect, equity could retain the reorganization shares by paying all creditor claims in
full. See id. at 788-92.
165 See Baird, supra note 1, at 136.
166 In our study there were numerous occasions where reorganization securities did
not actively trade until after their issuance, and even then it was only possible to get bid-
ask quotes. With such little trading there is more reason to question the accuracy of
the market's valuation.
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are not always in the creditors' best interests. For example, at times
a small distribution to equity can help to ensure a market in
reorganization securities.
1 67
Our proposal would make it easier for senior parties to compel
adherence to the absolute priority rule in cases in which creditors
will clearly receive only a small part of their claims, and at the same
time it would permit those parties to agree to a different distribu-
tion scheme if there is good reason to do so. Its goal is elimination
of distributions to junior interests that result solely from actual or
feared abuses of legal process.
B. Are Junior Interests Being Short-Changed?
In some cases in which equity recovered more than they would
have been entitled to in an adjudication under the absolute priority
rule, there remains an argument that they are being short-changed.
The argument is based on the Realist proposition that it is out-
comes, not announced rules, that constitute the law.1 68 Absolute
priority should not be considered the norm, because the same
Bankruptcy Code that establishes it as the rule for adjudication also
establishes procedures that lead to equitable sharing between
creditors and shareholders in the large majority of cases.
169
Under this argument, equity is short-changed in some cases because
they are denied use of the procedures that would enable them to
force an equitable sharing.
Our data suggests that consolidating representation of equity
through appointment of an equity committee is an important
element of that procedure. In every case in which a committee was
appointed, equity received a share in the distribution regardless of
how little was distributed to unsecured creditors. If committees had
been appointed in the remaining cases, we think that equity holders
would have shared in those distributions as well.
1 70
167 See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
16 See K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1951).
169 See supra Tables III, IV(A) -9c IV(B) following notes 33, 90 & 118.
170 When Congress adopted the 1938 Bankruptcy Act, it expressed concern about
collusion between management and bank interests that short-changed less well
organized interests such as publicly held debt. Many of the protections for less well
organized interests that were instituted in 1938 have since been repealed, such as the
mandatory appointment of trustees, court review of bargains to assure that they were
in compliance with the absolute priority rule, and enhanced judicial control over the
process of appointing committees. In a separate article based on the data from this
study which will focus on the role and loyalties of management in the large chapter 11
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Considering the importance of equity committees to the
interests they represent, the process by which they may come into
being in a particular case is worthy of examination. The Bankruptcy
Code provides for appointment of an equity committee only if the
court determines that a committee is "necessary to assure adequate
representation, " 171 or, in a U.S. Trustee district, the U.S. Trustee
deems appointment appropriate. 72  The initiative for appoint-
ment of equity committees in our study came primarily from three
sources: the SEC, 173 existing shareholders, and investors who
bought shares after the filing of the bankruptcy case. In most of the
cases in which there was no equity committee, there was no request
for one. There were, however, three notable exceptions. In Pizza
Time Theatre, motions filed by equity holders and supported by the
Securities and Exchange Commission were denied by the court,
apparently because equity interests were so far underwater that the
court thought that funds should not be expended in their represen-
tation. In Storage Technology, the U.S. Trustee refused to appoint
a committee because two of the three equity holders willing to serve
were class action plaintiffs in securities litigation.' 74 In Manville,
the court disbanded the official equity committee after it opposed
confirmation and attempted to convene a shareholders' meeting to
replace management.
In each of these cases, the denial of a committee inevitably
altered the ultimate bargain contained in the reorganization plan.
The courts and U.S. Trustees reached their decisions without
explicit consideration of the evidence bearing on what the distribu-
tion to equity should be. On the other hand, there is no way to be
neutral in such circumstances. In Pizza Time Theatre, a decision to
cases, we will argue that money center banks and other institutional lenders were
frequently able to win the allegiance of management and thereby considerably reduce
the power ofjunior creditors and shareholders. This observation is an additional reason
to be concerned about the lack of representation of equity in these cases.
"1 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (1988).
172 See id. § 1102(a)(1). This basis for appointment was applied in only some
districts during most of the period covered by our study. Currently, it applies in nearly
all districts.
173 A member of the SEC's General Counsel staff told us that the Commission had
either moved for or supported a motion for the appointment of an equity committee
in 16 of the cases in our study.
174 In many of the cases in our study, when the bankruptcy petition was filed, there
were actions pending against the debtor on behalf of investors who alleged that they
had been defrauded in their pre-bankruptcy purchase of the debtors' securities.
Membership on an equity committee can be an easy way for such persons to obtain
discovery and was therefore commonly resisted by management.
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appoint an equity committee would almost inevitably have led to a
larger distribution to the equity class, which many would consider
inappropriate given the low payout to creditors.
Such judicial control over the outcome of informal bargaining
is not limited to the decision to appoint or refuse to appoint an
equity committee. The court also may determine the level of
logistical support that will be available to the committee. Equity
committees are almost always more moderately staffed than
creditors' committees. While all equity committees in our study had
an attorney, equity commr.ittees were much less likely than other
committees to be advised by accountants or investment bankers.
Many decisions to appoint equity committees and allocate
resources to them were probably based onjudgments about whether
equity should share in the bargain. Although the absolute priority
rule is not enforced at confirmation of a consensual plan, it is
loosely and inconsistently enforced in the decisions on whether to
appoint equity committees and on what level of resources to provide
them. A better system would allow judges to determine directly
whether equity and other junior interests should participate in the
distribution. Our preemptive cram down proposal would permit
that determination. If that reform were adopted, U.S. Trustees
could then appoint equity committees early in the case without
thereby determining that equity will participate in the distribu-
tion.1 75 A subsequent preemptive cram down could still prevent
such a distribution.
The SEC recently initiated a procedure to reevaluate its role in
bankruptcy reorganization cases.1 76 Since 1983, the SEC has
limited its function primarily to moving for appointment of
committees to represent public security holders and to reviewing
the adequacy of disclosure statements. 177 It does not participate
in reorganization plan negotiations, and it does not challenge
proposed plans on their merits at confirmation. 178 The Commis-
175 Under the reform we have suggested, if the judge could determine from the very
beginning of the case that equity should not participate, it would be appropriate to
refuse appointment of an equity committee.
176 See Request for Public Comments on the Role of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in Reorganization Cases Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
Corporate Reorganization Release No. 384, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,502 (Oct. 18, 1989). As of this writing, twelve months after the
request for comments, there has been no official action by the SEC.
177 The SEC has statutory authority to raise and contest any issue in a chapter 11
proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1988).
178 The policy change was announced by the SEC in 1983. See General Counsel's
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sion is now questioning whether it should continue to play even this
limited role, given that public security holders can act on their own
to secure appointment of a committee.
We believe that the SEC has played a valuable role in the cases
in our study and that it should remain active in the reorganization
of large, publicly held companies. The Commission's most
important function has probably been as a catalyst in the formation
of equity committees. Even in the reorganization of solvent
companies, the interests of public shareholders can suffer simply
because they are not present at the bargaining table.
179
Lack of representation of shareholders might be justified
theoretically if shareholder interests were asserted by management
or if shareholders, collectively, did not consider representation
worth the cost. That does not, however, appear to be an accurate
description of what happened in a number of our cases. There are
several cases in which no shareholder stepped forward to ask for the
appointment of a committee, even though management was not
asserting their interests. There are several possible reasons for this
phenomenon which belie any assumption that the shareholders as
a group decided that representation was not worth the cost. One
such reason is the classic "free rider" problem: a shareholder
receives no greater distribution than other shareholders because she
or he took the initiative to get the committee appointed. Members
of an equity committee may not even be reimbursed for their out
of pocket expenses, let alone compensated for their time. More-
over, because of their status, committee members may be barred
from trading in the company's stock by the insider trading
rules. 180
Statement Concerning Commission's Participation in Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases,
Corporate Reorganization Release No. 331, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83,484 (Feb. 2, 1984). The current practices, as described in the text,
reflect an even more limited involvement by the SEC than was necessarily contemplated
when the policy statement was issued.
179 The best example from our study is Storage Technology. See supra text
accompanying note 117.
180 One possible solution to this problem could be to collectivize the shareholder
position into the hands of one person or a small group, so that the person[s] who incur
the costs of representing the equity position reap all the benefits of that representation.
As discussed earlier in this Article, in several cases small groups of investors have
acquired a controlling block of subordinated debentures or other type ofjunior debt
and then have taken the lead in representing that class in reorganization plan
negotiations. Only rarely, though, have investors shown such an interest with respect
to an equity class. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
1990]
194 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:125
Where these factors impede the process of committee forma-
tion, the SEC can be the necessary catalyst. The SEC is better
suited to perform this role than the United States Trustee. The
bankruptcy reorganizations of large, publicly held companies are
filed throughout the United States, and the U.S. Trustee's office in
any city other than New York is unlikely to be involved in enough
of these cases, as compared with the much more numerous smaller
bankruptcies, to develop the expertise necessary to analyze them
and act effectively in them.
CONCLUSION
This Article is the first of several that report the findings of an
empirical study of the bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly
held companies. The data reported here bear on what many
consider to be the central issue of reorganization theory: how the
value of the reorganizing enterprise should be divided among the
various claims and interests. Our basic conclusions, which follow,
are based on our study of the forty-three largest publicly held
corporations to reorganize between 1979 and 1988.
First, bargaining and settlement rather than adjudication deter-
mined the outcomes of the cases in our study. Despite the
widespread publicity given to the highly aberrant Evans Products
case, a contested cram down against shareholders was a rare event.
When Congress in 1978 authorized the confirmation of a consensual
plan without a formal adjudicatory finding that the plan was fair and
equitable, it marked the practical end of adjudication as the final
step in large bankruptcy reorganizations. The bargain that was
struck among representatives of the various classes determined the
outcome of our cases; its ratification by the individual holders of
claims and interests appeared to be a mere formality.
Second, shareholders of insolvent companies nearly always
shared in the distribution under the plan. Among the cases studied,
this phenonenon ordinarily occurred even if the representatives of
equity refused to consent to the plan.'8 1 With one exception,
equity was "zeroed out" only in cases in which creditors were
receiving less than fourteen cents on the dollar. Though equity
regularly shared in the distribution in these cases, equity's share
almost invariably was small when measured as a percentage of the
total distribution. When compared with the outcomes of chapter 11
181 Examples of this phenomenon in our study are HRT and Manville.
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cases involving smaller companies,18 2 absolute priority can be
seen as a generally accurate description of the outcomes in these
large cases. Within the category of large cases, the relative size of
equity's recovery appeared to be not so much a product of the
financial conditions of the company as it was a product of the
quality and aggressiveness of equity's representation.
Third, in the cases of insolvent debtors, the observed deviations
from absolute priority were not to any significant degree the
product of difficulties in valuation. In nearly every case, the
negotiators knew the company was insolvent and that equity would
be entitled to nothing in an adjudication. Equity was allowed to
share in the disiribution for a wide variety of reasons. Central
among them was a generalized desire to have a consensual plan-one
supported by the debtor, the official committees, and major
creditors. Part of the reason for seeking such a plan was a concern
that equity might make trouble if there was an attempt to exclude
it. Yielding to such a fear was easier for creditors because the cost
of a distribution to equity was spread among so many creditors that
the portion borne by each one was too small to justify resistance.
To a large degree, however, the preference for a consensual plan
rather than an adjudication was a matter of legal culture. Although
these cases were spread throughout the United States, most of the
lawyers who played key roles in them were members of the same
legal community. They could expect to be involved in future cases
with their current adversaries and were to various degrees depen-
dent on those adversaries for professional respect and advance-
ment1 83 They were not entirely free to ignore the conventional
wisdom that consensual plans were the responsible, appropriate
fieans for accomplishing reorganization and that despite the
absolute priority rule, everyone at the bargaining table was entitled
to a share.
184
Fourth, in the cases in which the debtor was marginally solvent,
there were substantial deviations from the absolute priority rule,
leading to a kind of "equitable sharing" between creditors and
182 For a discussion of studies of these smaller cases, see supra notes 48-50 and
accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
184 Ironically, the lawyers receiving the most benefit from the norm favoring
consensual plans, the "spoilers" who made a practice of representing aggressive equity
and subdebt holders, were usually not members of the same legal community. The
relations were often hostile between these spoilers and the lawyers who represented
debtors, creditors' committees, and major creditor interests.
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equity holders. In part, this sharing was a product of perceived
difficulties with valuation. Although it is difficult to generalize
because the number of such cases was so small, aggressive represen-
tation seemed to yield big rewards for equity holders.
Fifth, in the cases of clearly solvent debtors, claims for pendency
interest highlight an important ambiguity in the absolute priority
rule: does the rule require that creditors have absolute priority over
shareholders only for the face amounts of their claims or should the
time value of the creditors' money also be protected? In four of our
cases, the bargain included the payment of at least some pendency
interest. If we assume that creditors are entitled to pendency
interest at full market rates, then in only one of our solvency cases
did creditors receive full payment.185 In that sense, it truly can
be said that the overall pattern in the cases of both solvent and
insolvent debtors was an "equitable sharing" of the loss between
creditors and shareholders.
Perhaps because it resolves public issues through inaccessible,
largely private bargaining, the system for reorganizing large,
publicly held companies has been the subject of much criticism.
With regard to the bargain over equity's share in the distribution,
while the dollar amounts of the deviations in favor of equity are
large, for the most part they are only a small percentage of the
overall distribution in these cases. Many perceive these deviations
as the "grease" that permits complex and otherwise unwieldy cases
to reach relatively expeditious conclusion. While we believe that the
elimination of relatively small deviations from the absolute priority
rule does not warrant the radical changes in chapter 11 that have
been proposed, 8 6 participation in these cases by junior claims
and interests clearly not entitled to a share under the absolute
priority rule may generate unnecessary complexity and expense and
encourage obstructionist tactics. The "preemptive cram down" that
we propose 187 should permit the bankruptcy courts to limit these
deleterious effects.
185 In that case, this level of payment was more by accident than design. See supra
text accompanying note 117 (discussing the Storage Technology case).186 See Baird, supra note 1, at 129-35; Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 781-88; Roe, supra
note 1, at 559-93.
18 7 See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text. The pattern of settlement that
this proposal seeks to alter is based on a custom which we consider unstable: it may be,
therefore, that this change in results will come about without the need for any change
in bankruptcy court practice. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49.
